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Matt Welch, tabloid.net


THE PUTNAM PIT
[No bull]
Here is the list of lawyers who have been suspended from practicing law by the Tennessee Supreme Court and need[ed] to be reinstated, as reported by the Tennessee Board of Professional Responsibility. 
e-mail for forms to report crooked lawyers
Dog X -- The Watchdog of the Upper Cumberland
 

B. SUSPENSIONS (Reinstatement Required)*

*ON APRIL 1, 1981, RULE 9 (4.2) WAS AMENDED TO PROVIDE THAT REINSTATEMENT WAS AUTOMATIC IN CASES OF SUSPENSIONS OF LESS THAN ONE YEAR RATHER THAN THREE MONTHS OR LESS AS PROVIDED PRIOR TO THE AMENDMENT.
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Fred L. Allen, of Franklin, Williamson County, was suspended for one year beginning February 27, 1998. Allen submitted a conditional guilty plea to the Board on charges of sexually inappropriate conduct toward co-workers and clients, failure to maintain trust account records, neglect of clients' cases, and failure to communicate with clients. His suspension was coupled with the requirement that he reimburse his clients in a specific complaint $5,000 each.

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Bonnie J. Anderson-Yarling, who practiced in Nashville, was suspended for eighteen months by order entered August 27, 1987. She failed to file an answer and Motion for Default Judgment was granted.
Yarling neglected the cases of three of her clients. She did not return files upon request by her clients and she did not respond to numerous inquiries by the Board after complaints were filed by her clients.

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Albert John Archibald, of Shelby County, was charged with withholding settlement proceeds of the client to pay medical expenses of $115.00, which he failed for six months to pay, accepting a retainer of $350.00 on an estate matter and failing to act, and accepting a fee of $150.00 to file a suit and failing to act. He tendered a conditional guilty plea in exchange for a one year suspension, which was accepted. The one year suspension order was entered on February 3, 1983.
On December 3, 1985, Archibald's Petition for Reinstatement was denied.

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Peyton Wayne Arnold, of Murfreesboro, was suspended for five years upon his guilty plea to a portion of the charges filed against him. He was convicted by a jury for obtaining money by false pretense. The conviction resulted from Arnold's advice to a client that it would take $5,000 to $6,000 to "pay off" some people to take care of the client's criminal charges. The client reported the matter to law enforcement authorities who arranged the recorded payment of $6,000 to Arnold. Arnold denied there was a discussion of a bribe and contended the money was for his fees and the drug fund. His three-year prison sentence was suspended, and he was placed on probation for five years.

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James R. Austin, Jr., of Nashville, received a one year suspension in exchange for his plea of guilty to four separate complaints. In one case, after he decided not to file suit for his clients, he failed to inform them that they needed to obtain another attorney and file suit before their time limit expired. In another case, Austin failed to file a motion for new trial or to appear at his client's sentencing hearing. In the other two cases, Austin took virtually no action on behalf of his clients and failed to adequately communicate with them.

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James R. Austin, Jr., a Nashville attorney, was suspended from practice for five years by order of the Court on January 17, 1989. Austin consented to the five-year suspension following his guilty plea to criminal charges of possession of cocaine for resale, for which he received a four-year jail sentence.
Austin had been previously suspended from practicing on August 1, 1987, for one year for four instances of neglect, and had not been reinstated.

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Javier Michael Bailey, of Memphis, was suspended for three (3) years, with all time suspended with respondent being on probation, except for sixty (60) days of actual suspension, on the condition that Bailey comply with certain conditions.

Pursuant to Rule 9, Section 16, Bailey submitted a conditional guilty plea in exchange for a stated form of discipline.
The suspension also specifies that Bailey shall enter a treatment center for drug addiction and/or psychiatric problems. Bailey agreed to comply with whatever treatment and aftercare are recommended. Further, Bailey shall enter a three (3) year contract with Lawyers Helping Lawyers, shall have a monitor, who will make quarterly reports for three (3) years about Bailey's compliance and who shall notify Bailey of random drug screens, making quarterly reports also about the results of those drug tests and about Bailey's compliance with Lawyers Helping Lawyers contract.
Bailey must also immediately make restitution and in the event his probation is revoked, the suspension shall remain in effect until an order of reinstatement is issued.

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John Thomas Baird, of Memphis, was temporarily suspended on October 8, 1991 for failure to respond to the Board of Professional Responsibility's inquiry regarding the management of his escrow account and funds entrusted to him. A hearing before the Board to dissolve the temporary suspension resulted in the following recommendation of findings to the Supreme Court: Baird admittedly paid personal obligations from his trust account, he failed to produce his canceled checks from his trust account, he kept large sums of cash in his office to keep the funds away from the IRS, and he maintained no records to reflect his cash sources or disbursements. The Supreme Court entered an order keeping the temporary suspension in effect until final disposition of the pending disciplinary charges. The resulting sanction was the time served on temporary suspension from October 8, 1991 through April 6, 1998 - the final order date approving the sanction.

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Charles C. Baker, of Nashville, was suspended for one year upon approval by the Chancery Court of the hearing panel recommendation. When he received the proceeds of a settlement, he paid the money due to his client but failed to pay the monies due to two other attorneys that had worked with him on the lawsuit. He instead converted the money to his personal use.

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James V. Ball, a Memphis lawyer, was suspended for one year by order entered on April 6, 1988. Ball represented a client, collected a settlement upon her behalf, and agreed to reimburse her medical providers for medical services. However, Ball failed to pay the providers the amounts ($15,470.31 and $13,130.81) awed despite frequent requests over a six-month period. Instead he converted to his personal use the monies he held in trust for these providers. Ball did reimburse the providers all monies owed.

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James L. Banks, of Hamilton County, was suspended for one year following an opinion of the Supreme Court, Disciplinary Board V. Banks, 642 S.W.2d 501. The Court affirmed the findings of the Hearing Panel and Circuit Court that his conduct was improper by receiving funds from his client and investing them in his personal ventures. He failed to properly account for the funds to his client. The client brought suit, which was dismissed when Banks paid her $45,000 and a note of $20,000. The client had to pay a $15,000 attorney fee to make the recovery.

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Howard Barnwell, of Chattanooga, pled guilty in exchange for a suspension of five years as of April 1, 1987. He had been on interim suspension since his conviction of felonious solicitation to commit perjury. Barnwell, while representing a criminal defendant, attempted to cause the principal witness against the client to change his testimony, using threats and an offer to bribe in doing so.

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James V. Barr, III, of Davidson County, was suspended from practicing law for five years beginning retroactively on November 30, 1994 for his convictions of bank fraud and making a false declaration under penalty of perjury. A Hearing Panel for the Board of Professional Responsibility found Respondent's conviction violated DR 1-102; DR 2-106; DR 6-101; DR 7-101; DR 7-102; DR 7-106; and DR 9-102. Additionally the panel found the Respondent to have violated DR 2-110; DR 5-101; and DR 7-104. The panel found Respondent's prior disciplinary record of a public censure to be an aggravating circumstance; however, the panel did find that the Respondent's admissions of wrongdoing, regret, and willingness to have a mentor and to complete additional continuing legal education classes were mitigating factors. As a result, the panel recommended, and the Supreme Court approved, a five-year suspension and required the Respondent to complete a minimum of thirty hours of continuing education classes on ethics and professionalism before filing a petition for reinstatement.

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Russell Bean, of Chattanooga, entered a guilty plea in exchange for a definite suspension of one year to be followed by an indefinite suspension for so long as he should be incarcerated or have an appeal pending. He had been under interim suspension since a jury convicted him of larceny on October 7, 1986. He had taken from the possession of an FBI undercover agent a tape recorder which was being used to record his conversation with the agent.

A mitigating factor in determining the length of the suspension was the submission of affidavits from three of the jurors which stated that they would not have voted to convict Bean had they known he would lose his law license. The jurors stated that all five months and twenty-nine days of Bean's three year sentence. He was placed on probation for the re they did not believe Bean was a thief but that he panicked when he discovered he was being tape recorded.
The Criminal Court suspended mainder of the time and ordered to undergo periodic drug screening.
On October 3, 1988, Bean was reinstated to the practice of law.

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Henry M. Beaty, Jr., a Memphis attorney, was suspended for four (4) years by Order entered October 27, 1992. Beaty was temporarily suspended on unrelated charges since June 11, 1992.

A Petition for Discipline was filed and a hearing was held on July 7 and 8, 1992. The Hearing Committee found that Beaty filed false and fraudulent accountings in the Probate Court; he commingled trust funds with his personal funds; and entered into personal business transactions with his client, an incompetent person. Beaty also neglected the representation as conservator, failed to make prudent investments, and failed to promptly deliver funds to the client after he was replaced by another conservator. No appeal was taken from the judgment and it was approved by the Supreme Court.

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Henry M. Beaty, Jr., of Memphis, on October 28, 1996, the Supreme Court entered an Agreed Order of Enforcement adjudging and currently under suspension, to be in willful contempt of court. The Court extended the current suspension of Beaty's law license for two additional years (or until October 28, 1998) and indefinitely until he is reinstated. Mr. Beaty has been suspended since October 27, 1992 for four (4) years and indefinitely until reinstated.

The Petition for an Order of Contempt was filed against Beaty because he had been employed directly by a client as a paralegal and a law clerk, between 1994 and March 1996, while his law license was suspended. In its October 28, 1996, order, the Supreme Court also entered a judgment against Beaty in favor of the estate of a former client which Beaty had previously defrauded, and which must be repaid in full prior to any reinstatement of his law license. Beaty must also provide affidavits from all employers from March 1996 to the date of any reinstatement proceedings, showing that he has not been employed in any capacity in a law business.

Due to Beaty's cooperation with Disciplinary Counsel and his stopping work as a paralegal or clerk, his ethical violations have been somewhat mitigated. The Supreme Court did not punish him by fine or by order of imprisonment for this contempt.

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James B. Bell, of Shelby County and formerly from Nashville, tendered a plea of guilty in exchange for a five-year suspension following his conviction of knowingly making a false statement to a bank to secure a loan by failing to list his actual liabilities to banks on his financial statement. The tendered plea was submitted directly to the Board without the intervention of a hearing panel and approved. The Supreme Court entered the five-year suspension of June 16, 1980.

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Lawrence Bidwell, IV, of Maryville, Tennessee, was suspended for suspended for five years retroactive to April 5, 1989. Bidwell converted to personal use an amount of monies held in trust by him. Said monies converted exceeded $50,000.

He pled guilty to a petition which was filed with the Board. The plea was approved by a hearing committee. Bidwell's license was summarily temporarily suspended on April 5, 1989.

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John B. Blair III, a Nashville attorney, was suspended by Order entered on October 3, 1994. The suspension was for one year with all time suspended with Blair being on probation, except for thirty days, conditioned upon Blair complying with certain conditions. Blair had been temporarily suspended since March 10, 1994 for failure to respond to complaints of misconduct.
Blair was required to be evaluated for emotional, psychological, and/or alcohol drug dependency, and ordered to comply with whatever treatment or aftercare program that is recommended by the treatment center. The suspension order further specified that Blair have a monitor to make quarterly reports to the Board for eleven months. Blair was also ordered to submit to the Nashville Bar
Practice Assistance Committee and the Nashville Bar Mentoring Program for eleven months. Blair was also required to provide the Board with evidence that he obtained office space in a multiple attorney office setting and was to remain in such setting for eleven months. Blair submitted a conditional guilty plea in response to the Petition for Discipline.

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Alva F. Bonds, Jr., was suspended for a definite period of six months by order entered April 22, 1980, after a hearing panel found that he had failed to deliver settlement proceeds of $1,226.70 to his client. In another instance, he failed to deliver the file to a client after being discharged for neglecting the matter. In addition to the definite period, he was suspended for an indefinite period conditioned upon his making full restitution of the settlement proceeds and delivering the file and accounting for all monies advanced.

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Richard Bonnington, a Chattanooga attorney, was suspended for four years from the date of his voluntary cessation from practice by order entered by the Supreme Court on December 5, 1988.
Bonnington had misappropriated $20,789 over a three-year period from an estate he had been appointed to administer. The largest amount which he had removed from the estate account at any one time was $11,600.
A hearing panel recommended the four-year suspension. The Board appealed the four-year judgment to the Circuit Court which upheld the panel's decision. Upon appeal of that decision, the Supreme Court found Bonnington's restitutions to the estate a mitigating factor and upheld the four-year suspension despite Disciplinary Counsel's argument for disbarment. The Court made as a prerequisite to Bonnington's possible reinstatement that he further reimburse the estate $4000 in interest which the estate had lost over the years as a result of his misappropriation and the $7000 in attorney's fees awarded to him from the estate.

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Timothy L. Bowden, of Nashville, on May 13, 1996, had his license to practice law suspended for two years, retroactive to December 8, 1995, the date on which he was first suspended. His suspension is the result of his conviction by guilty plea to two (2) counts of mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341 and 1342.
Mr. Bowden filed a conditional guilty plea in exchange for a stated form (5/31/97) B-38 of discipline in which he admitted his quilt of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1341 and 1342 and DR 1-102(A)(1)(3)(4)(5)(6) and T.C.A. 23-3-201(l)(5). The Supreme Court accepted and approved the guilty plea by entering an order suspending Bowden. The Court further ordered that Bowden pay the costs of the disciplinary proceedings.

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Franklin D. Brabson, a Nashville attorney, was suspended for one (1) year by Order entered by the Supreme Court on December 22, 1992. The Supreme Court modified an Order of the Chancery Court. The Chancery Court, affirming a Hearing Panel Judgment, ordered a one (1) year suspension. The Supreme Court affirmed the suspension but stated Brabson was given leave to apply for reinstatement after ninety (90) days if he had made full restitution to the Complainant-victim.
Brabson received $3,000 of client funds in cash which he stated he gave to his client. The client denied receipt of the funds. The Supreme Court found that Brabson violated DR 9-102(A) which requires all funds of clients to be placed in a trust account. Brabson also engaged in deceit and misrepresentation in his testimony; and failed to inform his client about the loss of her funds. Brabson also disbursed funds from his trust account before the checks had cleared.

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Travis Brasfield, a Knoxville attorney, was suspended for one year by Order entered on May 1, 1993. Brasfield filed a conditional guilty plea in response to a Petition for Discipline. The Petition alleged Brasfield commingled personal funds with monies held in trust. As a result, Brasfield converted trust funds to personal use.

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David M. Bratcher, a Nashville lawyer, was suspended for four (4) years by Order entered June 23, 1992. The suspension was retroactive to May 22, 1991, the date upon which Bratcher was temporarily suspended by Order of the Supreme Court.
The Board filed a Petition for Discipline Supplemental Petition for Discipline, Second Supplemental Petition for Discipline, and Third Supplemental Petition for Discipline against Bratcher. Bratcher submitted a Conditional Guilty Plea in exchange for a stated form of discipline or punishment. The guilty plea and stated form of discipline embraced all pending complaints and any others which may arise, involving complaints arising out of Bratcher's conduct in his practice of law prior to his suspension.

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Nathan Edward Brooks, of Chattanooga, was suspended for two years by an order entered February 19, 1998. Brooks entered a conditional guilty plea to violating DR 1-102; DR 2-106; DR 2-110; DR 6-101; DR 7-101; DR 7-106; DR 9-102 and T.C.A. § 23-3-201(3)(5). The charges against Brooks alleged that he neglected or failed to perform legal matters or services for eleven clients which he had retained. Brooks agreed to make restitution of fees to certain clients as part of his agreement with the Board and the Supreme Court accepted the plea.

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Charles F. Brown, Jr. of Nashville, was suspended for two years from April 1, 1997 through March 31, 1999. Brown submitted a Conditional Guilty Plea to violations of DR 1-102(A)(3)(4)(5)(6); DR 5-101(A) and DR 9-102(B).
While serving as Trustee for a Trust from October 1983, until his resignation on June 23, 1994 Brown borrowed money from the Trust without the knowledge or permission of the Trustor or beneficiary. Although Brown later repaid the money to the Trust with $500.00 payment for interest, he did not pay money calculated as interest. Brown also neglected to file tax returns for the Trust during the ten years he served as Trustee.
Brown admitted the above when the Trust Beneficiary inquired about same in April 1995, and confirmed same to beneficiary's attorney in October 1995. Brown repaid the money owed to the Trust, including money expended to audit the account due to Brown's actions. Brown reported himself for his misconduct.

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A. G. Burkhart, Jr., of Memphis, on May 3, 1996, was suspended. The suspension order is retroactively effective from March 4, 1994. Burkhart was suspended on January 10, 1990 and has since remained on suspension based on his conviction in Federal Court of thirty-three (33) counts of a thirty-three (33) count indictment which charged that while acting as a guardian in a fiduciary he embezzled and misappropriated funds entrusted to him by the Veterans Administration.
A petition for discipline was filed by the Board of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court. Mr. Burkhart appealed the decision of the hearing panel in his disciplinary proceedings and in the interim made restitution. In an effort to resolve the appeal both the Board and Burkhart agreed that he should be suspended for a period five (5) years retroactive to March 4, 1994. The Chancellor sitting to hear the appeal entered an Agreed Order on March 14, 1996 suspending Burkhart for five (5) years retroactive to March 4, 1994. The Chancellor further ordered that Burkhart pay all costs of the disciplinary proceeding and appeal, pursuant to Section 24.3 of Rule 9, Tennessee Supreme Court Rules. The suspension order shall remain in effect until an Order of Reinstatement is issued by the Supreme Court.

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S. Thomas Burnett, a Jamestown lawyer, was suspended for a period of five (5) years by Order entered March 26, 1991. The suspension was retroactive to August 15, 1990. A Petition for Discipline was filed by the Board and Burnett submitted a conditional guilty plea to the Petition. His suspension resulted from his conviction in the United States District Court on nine counts of a 10-count indictment which charged that Burnett did violate Title 18, United States Code, Section 371, by conspiracy and overt acts to acquire and control the charters of religious, charitable and nonprofit organizations so that an illegal gambling enterprise could be conducted in the name of such organizations; in violation of Title 18, United States Code Section 1955, Section 2, by conducting, financing, managing, supervising, directing and owning an illegal gambling business involving Bingo; and violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1341, by scheming to defraud and obtain money by false pretenses, representation and promises, from individuals induced into providing money to establish his Bingo operation-hall in Tennessee; and violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1341 and 1342, by concealing that he had misapplied funds for his own personal use and benefit.

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Jesse W. Butler, of Knoxville, was suspended for one year beginning October 1, 1983, and continuing thereafter until reinstated. The Hearing Panel found that Butler sat as Special General Sessions Judge and disposed of a D.U.I. case involving his client, and on another occasion Butler, armed with two hand guns, threatened and menaced several people while at a liquor store. He fired one random shot. The dangerous event terminated only when police arrived, disarmed him, and took him into custody. The Hearing Panel found that Butler was afflicted with depression, aggravated by alcohol and inappropriate medication. The Panel found that the mental or emotional illness was not an excuse or defense to the conduct, but that mitigation of the discipline imposed was proper to avoid unnecessary interference with his efforts to become rehabilitated. On June 27, 1985, Butler was reinstated to the practice of law.
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Patricia Spicer Carden, of Williamson County, on May 28, 1996, had her law license suspended. The suspension is for two years and was ordered to be concurrent with the period of her Pre-Trial Diversion in the criminal case of State V. Carden in Williamson County. This diversion began on January 1, 1995. Ms. Carden effectively began closing her office on that date. The Court ordered that the suspension cannot end any earlier than January 1, 1997.
This suspension was the result of a settlement agreement between Ms. Carden and Disciplinary counsel and approved by the Supreme Court.

Disciplinary Counsel had filed two petitions as to Carden. The following charges were included in the petitions:
(1) A complaint by a client charging that Ms. Carden neglected and delayed a real estate closing involving himself and the lender. It also charged that Ms. Carden misrepresented that she had mailed letters and documentation, when she had not, and that she failed to deliver her file swiftly to the successive counsel when she was requested to do so.
(2) A complaint by clients charging that she had neglected and delayed a real estate closing she handled pertaining to a house they bought. The clients sued Ms. Carden and the real estate agent involved in the closing and charged Carden was guilty of a conflict of interest for representing said real estate agent for part of the suit. They further charged her with making misrepresentations to them.

(3) An investment corporation charged that she served as their attorney in collection matters and that she neglected said representations and failed to communicate adequately with them. She also settled matters without their authority and failed to deliver their file when questioned.

(4) A former employee of Carden's charged her with delay in paying to the Chapter 13 Trustee monies which had been deducted from the employee's pay check.

(5) Another complaint charged Carden with improper Trust account procedures when she received checks relevant to legal matters and retained them in her files rather than promptly depositing them in her Trust account.

(6) In the most serious complaint, Judge Cornelia Clark advised the board that Carden had prepared a document entitled "Order Confirming Sale." The order contained the signature of Judge Clark and a signature of Ms. Carden as "Approved for Entry." The order was a forgery. No such order had been entered or signed by Judge Clark. Carden had represented to a Real Estate Agent and a Deputy Circuit Clerk that the forged order was accurate. Carden has been indicted for this and is currently on Pre-Trial Diversion.

These petitions charge Ms. Carden with violating several rules in Rule 8, Rules of the Supreme Court of Tennessee, DR 1-102(A), 2-110(A), 5-101, 5102, 6-101(A), 7-101(A) and (B), 7-102(A), 7-106(C) and 9-102(A).
The discipline was administered pursuant to Rule 9, Rules of the Supreme Court.

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Joe D. Carter, of DeKalb County, was suspended from the practice of law for four years beginning retroactively on September 20, 1995 for his conduct in his practice of law. Respondent plead guilty to all pending complaints and any other complaints which may have arisen prior to the entry of this cause's Final Order. He admits violating DR 1-102; DR 2-110; DR 2-106; DR 3-101, DR 6-101; DR 7-101; DR 7-102, DR 9-102 and Tenn. Code Ann. § § 23-3-201(3)(5). Carter was ordered to make restitution to all complainants for any valid claims for fees or costs which complainants paid to him without receiving services. This restitution was required before reinstatement would occur. Additionally, Carter was required to attend continuing legal education classes sufficient enough to put him in compliance with CLE requirements before reinstatement would occur.

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G. Battle Claiborne, of Nashville, was suspended for a definite period of two years and thereafter until restitution is made after Claiborne submitted a guilty plea to (1) acting upon the predetermined decisions and directions of an interested politician while he served as Assistant Director of the Tennessee Alcoholic Beverage Commission in matters involving transfer of liquor license applications and new license applications; (2) submitting his check, which was returned for insufficient funds, in the purchase of stock on behalf of an undisclosed client; and (3) failing to account for funds and issuing bad checks in remittance of funds collected on behalf of a client.

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Linda Staples Clements, a Memphis attorney, was suspended for five years by order entered on February 25, 1988. The Board approved and accepted Clements' conditional guilty plea which the Court affirmed. Clements had pled guilty to and was convicted of conspiracy to escape from Shelby County Jail. She was sentenced to eight months in the Shelby County Workhouse, and was placed on probation after serving approximately six weeks of her sentence.
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Thomas Gerald (Jerry) Clyce, of Jackson, was suspended from the practice of law for six months and for an additional indefinite period for filing a divorce action alleging non-residency of the defendant. The Court requested a sworn affidavit as to residence. Respondent failed to file the affidavit and claimed to have done so because the client failed to pay the balance of his fee. The client then paid the full fee. He never completed the divorce action, and his client believed she was divorced and entered into a second marriage.
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John B. Coleman II, of Maury County, tendered a conditional guilty plea to a two-year suspension. In one matter, he accepted client's funds in excess of $1,600 which were to be paid on the client's mortgage note. The client received a past due notice and inquired. Coleman stated the funds had been paid by money order and the client, upon investigation, found that the information was false. Coleman admitted to the client that his story was false and then obtained a loan to make restitution to the client. There were five instances where Coleman mishandled bankruptcy matters by accepting retainers and filing fees and not proceeding in a timely manner and his checks to the Bankruptcy Court for filing fees were dishonored. The Hearing Panel accepted the plea, and an order of suspension for two years was entered on June 17, 1982.
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David Collins, a Nashville attorney, was suspended for five years by Order filed May 25, 1993. Collins was convicted in United States District court for conspiring to commit mail fraud. It involved a scheme to defraud in connection with the manufacture and market of plastic or fiberglass ballot boxes. At the time of this occurrence, Collins was employed by the Tennessee Secretary of State's Office as the Coordinator of Elections. Collins submitted a guilty plea to the Petition for Discipline.
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William Claude Collins, Jr., an attorney licensed to practice law in Tennessee, and formerly the Program Director of Memphis Area Legal Services, Inc., was suspended for a period of five (5) years by order entered May 15, 1991.
Collins was indicted and subsequently convicted by the United States Government for knowingly and willfully embezzling money and services owned by and under the care, custody and control of the Memphis Area Legal Services, Inc. Collins surrendered his license to practice law to the Supreme Court on October 31, 1989.
The Board filed formal charges of ethical misconduct against Collins. He subsequently entered a guilty plea to the charges for a stated form of punishment - that he be suspended from the practice of law in Tennessee for five years commencing as of the date he surrendered his license to the Supreme Court of Tennessee.

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Elbert M. Cooper, of Anderson County, Tennessee was suspended on October 14, 1991 until January 1, 1994. Cooper was convicted of bank fraud in United States District Court involving the Anderson County Bank. Cooper submitted a guilty plea to a hearing panel of the Board. After January 1, 1994, Cooper was eligible to apply for reinstatement.
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Joel H. Dark, of Davidson County, was convicted of willfully failing to file his income tax returns and sentenced to five months imprisonment and a one year sentence to be suspended with a three-year probationary period. He was summarily suspended and on December 17, 1980, he was suspended until May 1, 1981, or at an earlier date if his probation was terminated. Dark was reinstated on October 5, 1981, after a reinstatement hearing before a hearing panel.
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Stanley D. Darnell, a Clarksville lawyer, was suspended from the practice of law in this state for a period of two (2) years, the suspension to be retroactive to September 12, 1990.
Darnell submitted a conditional guilty plea to the Board's petition in exchange for a stated form of discipline or punishment. The guilty plea and stated form of discipline embraced 23 pending complaints involving negligence and failure to communicate with his clients.
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Stanley D. Darnell, an attorney in Robertson county, was suspended for sixteen months by Order entered on January 11, 1995. The suspension was retroactive to September 12, 1992. Darnell submitted a conditional guilty plea in response to a Petition for Discipline.

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David Neal Deputy, who practiced in Gallatin, was suspended for four years commencing on October 12, 1987, by order entered December 17, 1987.

Thirteen complaints were filed with the Board against Deputy. These complaints reflected a course of misconduct which included neglect of legal matters entrusted to him by his clients, failure to keep his clients informed as to the progress and status of their legal matters, failure to account to his clients for fees paid for services to be rendered, abandonment of his clients and their legal matters, failure to return his clients, files and papers, and incompetence and lack of zeal on behalf of his clients.

Deputy aggravated the charges against him by failing to respond to the complaints, failing to take any action to resolve those matters complained of, and abandoning the practice of law by moving to Florida.

The Hearing Panel accepted Deputy's conditional guilty plea. In addition to the four-year suspension, Deputy received an indefinite suspension which would end upon his submitting proof that he had made restitution as quickly as possible to four different clients in the amounts of $1,000, $1,350, $450, and $170.

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James P. Diamond, of Jackson, was suspended for one year. Diamond was found guilty of failing to deposit settlement proceeds in a bank account separate from that used for his personal funds and office expenses and of failing to promptly pay a bill. Further, by failing to maintain adequate records of client funds in his possession, an unintentional conversion of client funds to his own personal use occurred.

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Francis E. Dichtel, of Memphis, on September 11, 1996, had his license suspended The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the Chancery Court. The Chancery Court affirming the hearing panel's judgment, ordered a suspension of one year and one month in addition to reinstatement being conditioned upon Dichtel making restitution to three former clients.

The Supreme Court found that Mr. Dichtel violated disciplinary rules as outlined in four (4) petitions for discipline filed against him. Specifically, Dichtel misled the Chancery Court in Shelby County about client funds and refused to answer the Court's questions about the funds. Additionally, though Dichtel ultimately paid the client funds into court, the Chancellor twice found Dichtel to be in intentional and deliberate contempt for his failure to follow the orders of the Court. His actions resulted in detriment to this client. Dichtel's retention of client funds and disregard of court orders violated DR 1-102(A)(5); DR 7-101(A)(2) and (4), DR 7-102(A)(3), DR 9-102(B) and T.C.A. 23-3-201(3).

The Court further found that in June 1991 and for several previous years, Dichtel commingled client trust funds and other monies and that during this period Dichtel established a pattern of paying personal expenses from his trust fund monies. Mr. Dichtel's mishandling of his trust account violated DR 9-102(A) and (B).

Dichtel represented a client in divorce proceedings. His client's spouse was murdered prior to the completion of the divorce. Dichtel's client was a suspect in the murder and Dichtel was aware of this. With the assistance of a lock company, Dichtel entered the deceased's home without the authorization of the court or the owner of the residence and removed certain personal property. During the criminal investigation, Dichtel did not initially admit taking certain property, but in a later deposition acknowledged doing so. Dichtel's entering the deceased's home, removing property and his misstatement about the property violated DR 1-102(A)(5).

Dichtel represented a client in a bankruptcy. Dichtel did not return his client's calls and did not file the bankruptcy petition. Dichtel failed to refund unearned fees to his client, thereby violating DR 2-110(A)(3) and DR 9-102(B)(4). Moreover, Mr. Dichtel willfully continued to refuse such repayments in violation of DR 9-102(B)(4).

Mr. Dichtel also represented a client in a petition for contempt and modification of child support. He failed to file an answer or attend a hearing which resulted in a default judgment against his client. Dichtel failed to refund unearned fees to this client, thereby violating DR 2110(A)(3) and DR 9-102(3)(4). Additionally, he continued to refuse repayments in violation of DR 9-102(B)(4).

In four other matters, Mr. Dichtel neglected the matter or failed to act competently for his client in violation of DR 6-101(A)(3) and DR 7-101(A). His neglect in these matters establishes a pattern of misconduct in violation of DR 1-102(A)(S) and (6).
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Jacob McGavock Dickinson IV, of Nashville, was suspended from practice for two years. A Hearing Panel recommended a one year suspension. The Board appealed, and an agreed order was entered to a two-year suspension. The findings of the Hearing Panel were that (1) Dickinson, in 1975, physically assaulted and injured a friend and threatened her life. He used illegal drugs which were purchased from his friend and used in her presence before and after his attack; (2) in 1978, he used superior physical force to engage in sexual intercourse with an acquaintance, notwithstanding her struggle and against her free will; (3) in 1979, he was involved in a notorious public disturbance at his apartment responded to by the police; (4) for a number of years he has abused alcohol, marijuana and other drugs, purchased illegal drugs, used illegal drugs in the presence of his clients, used illegal drugs at his office, encouraged and enticed others, including former employees, to use illegal drugs. The Panel found that alcohol and drug abuse led to and contributed to his misconduct and that he had taken positive steps to modify his conduct with substantial success. On May 27, 1987, Dickinson was reinstated to the practice of law.

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Danny Kaye Dockery, of Memphis, on October 14, 1996, had his license suspended for two years. A hearing panel found that in numerous instances over an extended period of time Dockery commingled entrusted funds with his personal funds and that he misappropriated to his own use and benefit the funds entrusted to him. The hearing panel further found that the proof demonstrated a pattern by Dockery of mismanaging his escrow account, his escrow records and using his escrow account for payment of personal and office expenses and showing no appreciation for the importance of maintaining his records accurately and doing this over an extended period of time. Dockery's acts and omissions constituted violations of DR 1-102(A)(1)(5)(6); DR 9-102(A)(2)(B)(1)(3)(4) and a violation of T.C.A. 23-3-201(3).
The hearing panel further found that Dockery's failure and refusal to respond appropriately to Disciplinary Counsel and the Board about allegations of ethical misconduct constitutes an additional violation of DR 1-102(A)(5)(6). The hearing panel further found as aggravating circumstances: Dockery's prior disciplinary offenses; a pattern of misconduct; bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceedings by intentionally failing to comply with the rules or orders of the disciplinary agency; submission of false evidence, false statements or other deceptive practices during the disciplinary process; refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of conduct; vulnerability of victim; substantial experience in the practice of law; and indifference to making restitution. Based on its finds, the hearing panel recommended the following sanctions be imposed upon Dockery:

1. A two-year suspension;
2. Reinstatement to be conditioned upon repayment of $1,500.00 to client; and
3. Reinstatement to be further conditioned upon successful completion of a three-hour legal ethics course at an accredited Tennessee law school.
The order of the hearing panel was appealed by Dockery to the Chancery Court of Shelby County which affirmed the hearing panel's findings.

Dockery appealed to the Tennessee Supreme Court which affirmed the judgment of the trial court in all respects, except as to the sanction requiring Dockery to pay $1,500 to plaintiff. The Court entered a judgment requiring instead a payment of $1,788, which must be satisfied as a condition of reinstatement.

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Richard H. Donnell, of Jackson, who had been suspended in August 1988, was again ordered suspended on January 19, 1989, for a period of one year. This additional suspension was based on allegations of misconduct which included leading a client to believe that several lawsuits had been filed on her behalf during representation over a period of years.
The hearing panel ordered the one-year suspension on December 4, 1987. Donnell filed an appeal on February 2, 1988. The Court on October 5, 1988, ordered that the appeal be dismissed based on Donnell's failure to file a transcript of the evidence before the hearing panel. The Court on July 26, 1988, directed him to promptly prepare and file the transcript. On September 16, the Court ordered that unless the transcript was filed on or before September 30, the appeal would be dismissed. The transcript was not prepared or filed.

The August 1988 suspension had resulted from allegations that his continued practice of law posed a substantial threat of irreparable ham to the public and that he had failed to respond to allegations that he forged or caused to be forged a quitclaim deed to himself and another person and caused the forged deed to be notarized and recorded in Carroll County.

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Richard Donnell, a Jackson attorney, was suspended for four years along with an indefinite suspension by order entered July 18, 1989. Donnell has been suspended since August 1988 by order resulting from allegations that his continued practice constituted a threat of irreparable harm to the public and that he had misappropriated funds entrusted to him.
He must make restitution of certain client funds and further has to complete a course of legal ethics at an accredited law school.

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George Howard Doty, of Nashville, was suspended for four years by order entered April 30, 1987. The Board voted to recommend the four-year suspension, which was to be retroactive to the date of the interim suspension, February 10, 1987, and Doty agreed. The pension resulted from Doty's conviction of sexual battery, for which he received a six-year suspended sentence.

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James E. Eikner, Jr., of Shelby County, submitted a conditional guilty plea in exchange for a one year suspension. The petition for discipline charged that he accepted two cases and allowed the statute of limitations to run out and failed to bring an action to remove a contractor's lien. The hearing panel, the Board, and the Court accepted the conditional plea, and an order was entered on May 10, 1983.
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E. Michael Ellis, of Knoxville, was suspended for a period of three and one-half years as a result of thirteen separate instances of misconduct involving thirteen individual clients or legal matters. He falsely assured clients in several instances that he had taken legal action on their behalf when he had not; failed to remit monies and property belonging to clients; entered into agreements concerning legal matters without the clients knowledge or consent; failed to preserve rights of clients; failed to file briefs in a timely fashion in appellate matters, for which he was held in contempt; negotiated checks while knowing they were not genuine; neglected legal matters; failed to communicate with clients; and falsely advised clients their court cases were set for trial on certain dates when the cases had not been set at all.

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Stanley G. Emert, a Knoxville attorney, was suspended for two years by order entered on February 1, 1994. The suspension stemmed from two Petitions for Discipline filed against Emert. The first one alleged Emert received $800 to pay property tax and delayed unnecessarily in paying the tax. Emert was charged with converting the money to his personal use. The second petition alleged Emert neglected a legal matter and misled his client and co-counsel regarding the case. Emert did not file an answer to these Petitions nor did he appear at the hearing. The hearing panel granted a default judgment and recommended a two-year suspension of Emert's law license.

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Helen G. Emmons, of Memphis, was suspended from practice for five years and an indefinite period thereafter until complete restitution is made to clients damaged from her misconduct and until she successfully completes a course in ethics. The discipline resulted from (1) failing to complete the closing of a real estate transaction, (2) allowing a statute of limitations to run on a personal injury and property damage matter, resulting in a $15,000 unsatisfied malpractice judgment against her, and (3) failing to complete the administration of an estate on behalf of a client. The Hearing Panel noted a continuing course of misconduct.

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H. T. Etheridge, Jr., of Jackson, was suspended from practice for five years. He appealed a judgment of disbarment recommended by a hearing Panel. The Chancery Court found that Etheridge (1) neglected to notify his clients and witnesses of a trial date and also later failed to advise the clients that he had signed and approved entry of a default judgment; (2) failed to file an answer on behalf of a client in a divorce case; (3) either intentionally gave false statements and evidence in an affidavit presented to the Court or his memory and mental state was so deficient that his actions were the result of an unintentional mental error; and (4) participated in the clandestine payment of a considerable sum of money to secure executive clemency for an ineligible client which amounted to a conspiracy to commit a crime of moral turpitude. The Chancery Court recommended a five-year suspension due to Etheridge's advanced age and because he had a long, reputable career. Because of his advanced age, he is not likely to seek reinstatement.

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John Arnold Fitzgerald, Rhea County, was suspended from practice for one year by order of the Supreme Court on November 18, 1980, for attempting to have a stolen diamond necklace returned to the prosecutrix if she dropped charges against his client, who was charged with receiving and concealing. The hearing panel imposed the one year suspension, which was reviewed on appeal and approved by the Circuit Court and Supreme Court following Respondent's appeal. The citation on this reported case is 607 S.W.2d 232. Fitzgerald's Petition for Reinstatement was granted on May 6, 1982.

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Steven Flatt, of Cookeville, was suspended for one year, with said suspension being retroactive to February 21, 1990, when he was temporarily suspended. Flatt entered a conditional guilty to the Petition for Discipline.

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Edgar Fleming, of Johnson City, entered a guilty plea to misconduct in the handling of a client's funds and accepted a two-year suspension. On November 2, 1982, Fleming received approximately $10,000.00 on behalf of his client in reference to a divorce case. In late January 1983, Fleming's bank seized approximately $7,200.00 from his account and applied the funds to his delinquent loan. Fleming fully repaid the money to his client in late 1984.

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Billy Jo Fulks, of Sumner County, was suspended in January 1979 for two years for his failure to proceed with two legal matters on behalf of a client or to communicate after having accepted employment and retainer fee on both cases. Respondent had been previously suspended in September 1976 for 90 days for similar conduct.

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John M. Goodhue, a Nashville attorney, was suspended for a period of one (1) year by Order entered October 2, 1990. A petition for discipline was filed and Goodhue entered a Conditional Guilty Plea on September 17, 1990, based upon the stated discipline.
Goodhue represented buyers in a transaction to purchase a Kentucky manufacturing business. In order to secure financing for the acquisition, Goodhue placed forged signatures of two sellers on a purchase agreement. The agreement was presented to two financial institutions as a valid contract and financing was obtained. Subsequently, a similar contract was actually signed. No injury or damage occurred because of the attorney's acts. Goodhue made full and free disclosure to Disciplinary Counsel regarding this matter and exhibited a cooperative attitude.

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William L. Gouger, Jr., of Marion County, was suspended for nine months beginning on December 15, 1996. Gouger entered a conditional guilty plea which was approved by the Board. (No additional information was provided with the file.)

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D. Rodney Greene, a Memphis attorney, was suspended by order of the Court on December 29, 1988. A hearing committee found that Greene had been incompetent in representing his client in a bankruptcy matter, had neglected the legal matter, failed to appear in court when appropriate, failed to communicate with his client, and had abandoned his client.
The committee also found that Greene's prior sanctions for similar conduct and his failure to respond to the allegations were matters that were considered as aggravating circumstances which enhanced the discipline imposed.
Greene's file was reactivated on March 29, 1989, with a petition for contempt filed with the Supreme Court. Section 18 of Rule 9 required Greene to notify clients, courts, agencies, and adverse attorneys of his suspension and inability to act as an attorney after the effective date of his suspension. Section 18.4 further required him to file an affidavit with the Court within ten days setting forth the particulars of his compliance. Greene failed to file the required affidavit with the Court or furnish the required copy to the Board.

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John Mark Hancock, a Knoxville attorney, was suspended until January 1, 1996 by Order entered on June 15, 1994. The suspension was made retroactive to May 21, 1992, the date his license was placed on temporary suspension status. The suspension relates to Hancock's representation of an estate. He induced the heirs to allow him to make an investment of estate funds and used estate funds to purchase a majority interest in a brokerage company that he later became Chief Executive Officer of. He also used $50,000 to make a loan to a business partner. As a result of the loan he was furnished a luxury automobile. Hancock failed to close the estate even upon request of the heirs and the heirs did not receive their money back until after disciplinary counsel filed formal charges.
Hancock was cited by the Securities and Exchange Commission for improper conduct and was barred from engaging in the securities business as a broker and dealer. Criminal charges were brought against him by the State and he was placed on pre-trial diversion. The suspension was the result of a settlement agreement entered into pursuant to a Petition for Discipline.

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Ronald E. Hedges, of Knox County, settled a personal injury claim on behalf of his client and withheld funds to pay the client's medical expenses. Hedges' check for the medical expenses was dishonored due to insufficient funds. The Hearing Panel found that Hedges commingled client funds with his personal funds and used client funds for his own personal needs. He also was found to have neglected another legal matter involving an estate. On June 22, 1983, the Court entered an order suspending Hedges from practice for one year.

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Tommy K. Hindman, a Knoxville attorney, was suspended for a period of two (2) years by Order entered April 8, 1991. The suspension was based on Hindman's conviction in Sevier County Circuit Court for using a minor for obscene purposes.
Hindman's license has been suspended on a temporary basis since November 6, 1989. The Supreme Court ordered that the two-year suspension be retroactive until that date.
This order was entered after Hindman filed a guilty plea to the petition for final discipline, filed by Disciplinary Counsel, and the plea was approved by a Hearing Panel of the Board of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tennessee.

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Floyd R. Hodge, of Knoxville, was suspended for one year beginning July 9, 1998. Hodge submitted a conditional guilty plea to the Board of Professional Responsibility for violating DR 1-102; DR 5-101;DR 5-102;DR 6-101;and DR 7-101. He allowed a default judgment to be entered against his client and did not inform his client of the default. His client did not learn of the default until his bank account was executed upon by the opposing party.

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Charles E. Hopfl, of Cumberland County, was immediately suspended pursuant to Rule 9 (14) for his conviction of submitting a false document to Small Business Administration for the purpose of obtaining money pursuant to the Small Business Act. The final discipline imposed by the hearing panel and approved by the Court was a suspension from the practice of law for a period of three years.

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Frederick A. Hunt, of Memphis, was convicted of failing to file federal income tax returns for three tax years. He was placed on interim suspension upon conviction of the serious crime. A hearing panel determined that the final discipline should be a continuation of his suspension for a fixed period of twenty-two months and an indefinite period thereafter until he successfully completes the conditions of his federal probation and submits medical verification of his successful treatment and rehabilitation from his alcohol abuse.

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Elwood Lee Hyden, a County Commissioner of Shelby County, and Samuel Martin Dattel, real estate agent and property owner of Shelby County, were charged with misconduct arising from certain land transactions and eminent domain proceedings. Hyden was charged with using the color of his elected office to obtain money from Dattel for Hyden's cooperation and powers of his office to insure that the government of Shelby County would widen and improve a road adjacent to Dattel's property. They were charged with devising a scheme for Dattel to obtain money through eminent domain proceedings to be used for this purpose by misrepresentations that Dattel owned certain property when, in fact, Dattel had already dedicated the property to public use. The hearing panel found that Hyden and Dattel were not dealing at arms length with respect to Dattel's purchase of Hyden's property in Mississippi during a time in which Hyden was also acting in his official capacity as Commissioner with a duty to exercise authority with respect to obtaining Dattel's Shelby County property by eminent domain. The hearing panel recommended a suspension from practice for three months as to Dattel and recommended a private reprimand as to Hyden. Disciplinary Counsel appealed to the Chancery Court of Shelby County and the discipline imposed by the Court was a suspension from practice of Hyden and Dattel for six months. On October 6, 1987, Hyden's application for reinstatement was denied.

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Harold G. Jeffers, of Scott County, was convicted of conspiracy and fraud involving tax shelters and was sentenced to terms of two years and eighteen months, suspended, fined $10,000, and placed on probation for three years. He was summarily suspended on April 9, 1981. On January 15, 1982, he was suspended for three years to begin on the date of his salary suspension.

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Fred E. Jones, Sr., a Memphis attorney, was suspended for five years pursuant to an Order entered on July 21, 1994. The suspension is retroactive to December 15, 1993, the date Jones was temporarily suspended. The suspension resulted from Jones' pattern of misappropriating trust funds. The Supreme Court also ordered Jones to make full restitution for any judgment or valid claim arising from his conduct. The suspension was pursuant to a conditional guilty plea submitted by Jones.

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James Milburn Jones, of Nashville, was suspended for two years. Jones submitted a guilty plea to charges of ethical misconduct based upon his conversion of approximately $11,500.00 trust funds to his own use while serving as trustee of two bankruptcy estates from 1983 to 1985. He made full reimbursement of all the funds.

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William P. Jones, of Sumner County, was suspended for two years with all time suspended for negligently using his trust account. Jones submitted a conditional guilty plea admitting he was in violation of DR 1-102; DR 7-102; DR 9-102; and T.C.A. § 23-3-201(5). He was placed on probation except for a period of ninety days between November 1, 1997 and January 29, 1998 on the condition that he comply with a number of requirements. These included: counseling with a monitor regarding the future use of his trust account, to complete six additional hours of ethical continuing legal education per year while he was on probation and to provide legal education through speaking engagements on the previous use of his trust account. Additionally, Jones was required to pay $20,000 to a client, without admitting or accepting any actual liability.
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Baxter Key, Jr., District Attorney General, Smith County, was immediately suspended pursuant to Rule 9 (14) for his plea of guilty of knowingly making a material false statement to a bank to secure a loan of $50,000.00 by representing a liability of $18,000.00 on real estate when in truth he was indebted in the amount of $179,000.00 and had other debts which he did not disclose. The hearing panel determined that the extent of final discipline should be suspension from practice for two years beginning after his release from incarceration. On February 7, 1986, Key non-suited his Petition for Reinstatement.

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Patrick J. Kennedy, a Nashville attorney, was suspended for five years by order entered on July 21, 1994. The suspension was retroactive to April 14, 1991, the date of his immediate suspension for conviction of a serious crime. Kennedy entered a guilty plea in criminal court to conspiracy to sell unregistered securities. He also entered a guilty plea to mail fraud in United States District Court. Both convictions resulted from Kennedy's operation of oil exploration ventures.

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Richard H. King, a Nashville attorney, was suspended by order filed April 29, 1993. The suspension was for one year plus an indefinite period of time thereafter until he complies with CLE and pays all fees and dues retired by the Board of Professional Responsibility. King's license was suspended for failure to comply with CLE and nonpayment of his annual fee. A hearing panel found that King engaged in the practice of law while his law license was suspended by appearing as attorney of record in a civil action. During the hearing, King admitted to several other court appearances where he misrepresented the status of his law license.

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Richard Korsakov, of Hamilton County, was suspended for eleven months and twenty-nine days beginning September 6, 1996. Korsakov was suspended for neglecting client's matters which he was retained to represent and was temporarily suspended for failure to respond to complaints by the Board of Professional Responsibility. Korsakov eventually entered a conditional guilty plea and the Board found him in violation of DR 1-102, DR 2-110; DR 6-101; DR 7-101; and DR 9-102, merging his temporary suspension into the above suspension.

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Charles R. Krivcher, a Memphis attorney, was suspended for two years, commencing on April 26, 1987, when he withdrew from practice, by order entered December 10, 1987.
At least sixteen disciplinary complaints had been filed against Krivcher all alleging a similar course of conduct. The Court approved the Hearing Panel's findings that his conduct demonstrated such neglect as to constitute an abandonment of his clients and their legal matters entrusted to him. After being paid a retainer fee, Krivcher made little or no effort to perform the services for which he was retained; failed and refused to communicate with his clients; and failed to accept clients' phone calls. The Court also approved the Hearing Panel's finding that Krivcher was paid substantial retaining fees for services which he never performed and he failed to account for the funds entrusted to him for those services.

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Anthony J. Kroll, of Greeneville and Knoxville, was suspended from the practice of law for three years by the Tennessee Supreme Court on May 23, 1986. Mr. Kroll pled guilty to converting to his personal use monies belonging to a client, for which Mr. Kroll held in trust.

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Loran Laughlin, who last practiced in Sommerville, but formerly practiced in Memphis, was suspended by order entered August 31, 1989, for five years. He was ordered immediately suspended on March 2, 1989, following the discovery of his misconduct in handling funds entrusted to him.
A conditional guilty plea admitting the allegations filed against him was accepted by the Board.
The five-year suspension will be followed by an additional suspension only to end upon proof that he has made complete restitution of all funds misappropriated by him.

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Richard E. Leddy, of Murfreesboro, who was temporarily suspended on December 16, 1994, agreed to a four-year suspension of his license retroactively beginning December 16, 1994. Mr. Leddy's guilty plea was approved by the Supreme Court on April 16, 1994. Mr. Leddy's guilty plea was based on formal disciplinary charges alleging misappropriation.
Mr. Leddy may apply for reinstatement to the practice of law after completing his four years suspension.

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Walter J. Lee, a Memphis attorney, was suspended for four years by Order entered on October 26, 1994. The suspension was retroactive to October 27, 1993, the date Lee was temporarily suspended. Lee submitted a conditional guilty plea to a Petition for Discipline and five Supplemental Petitions for Discipline. The Petitions embraced sixteen pending complaints involving negligence, failure to communicate with clients, and misapplication of client funds. Lee was ordered to make restitution to all Complainants for any valid claims for fees or costs which they paid to Lee without receiving services; and for payments withheld from settlements to be made to medical providers which were not paid by Lee.

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Mark Leedam, of Knox County, was suspended for a period of one year by order entered January 8, 1982, after a hearing panel found that he was paid and agreed to represent a client in a divorce matter and failed to take any action in her behalf. He falsely assured her that the case had been filed when in fact he had not filed it.

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William Norman Ligon, a Nashville attorney, was suspended for one year with the suspension commencing October 4, 1988, and ending October 4, 1989. A hearing committee found that Ligon had failed to handle a legal matter entrusted to him with competence and zeal and failed to keep his client advised of the progress and status of the legal matter. Further, he was found to have deceived his client as to the dismissal of her lawsuit.

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William Norman Ligon, of Nashville, on July 2, 1996, had his license suspended by the Supreme Court for a period of one (1) year with all time suspended and with Ligon being on probation except for a period of ninety (90) days of actual suspension, if Ligon complies with certain conditions.

Ligon's license was temporarily suspended under Section 4.3 of Supreme Court Rule 9 for failure to respond to a complaint of misconduct. Ligon then filed his response with the Board of Professional Responsibility and petitioned the Supreme Court for dissolution of his temporary suspension. A hearing on the petition for dissolution was held June 10, 1996 at which Ligon indicated to the Board panel that he wished to conclude not only his temporary suspension but also the complaints pending against him. After the hearing, pursuant to Section 16 of Supreme Court Rule 9, Ligon submitted a conditional guilty plea in exchange for a stated form of discipline and he withdrew his petition for dissolution. The conditional guilty plea was approved and accepted by the Supreme Court. Ligon admitted his guilt of violating Disciplinary Rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility: DR 1-102(A)(1)(4)(5)(6); DR 2-106(A)(B); DR 2-110(A)(B); DR 6-101(A)(1)(2)(3); DR 7-101(A)(1)(2)(3)(4); DR 9-102(A)(B) and T.C.A. 23-3-201(5). His conditional guilty plea together with his failure respond to the Board of Professional Responsibility for eight (8) months resulted in his temporary suspension.

The suspension order specified that Ligon shall enter a contract with the Nashville Bar Practice Assistance Committee, remain in compliance with the contract for the nine (9) month period of probation and shall provide evidence of the contract and his compliance to the Board of Professional Responsibility. The order further specified that Ligon shall have a monitor, who shall make periodic reports to the Board for the period of probation regarding Ligon's compliance. The order further specified that Ligon should provide the Board with evidence of his enrollment in the Nashville Bar Association's mentoring/colleagues program and continue in that program for nine (9) months.

The suspension order further specified that, prior to the expiration of the probation period, Ligon shall make refunds to complainants and that, in the event Ligon's probation is revoked, the entire suspension of one year shall go into effect and remain in effect until an order of reinstatement is issued.

Ligon's suspension was based on violations of DR 1-102(A)(1)(4)(5)(6); DR 2-106(A)(B); DR 2-110(A)(B); DR 6-101(A)(1)(2)(3); DR 7-101(A)(1)(2)(3)(4); DR 9-102(A)(B) and T.C.A. 23-3-201(5).

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William Norman Ligon, of Nashville, on January 10, 1997, was suspended for one (1) year effective on January 10, 1998, with credit being given for a period of ninety (90) days' suspension which had already been served.
On July 2, 1996, respondent was suspended for one (1) year, with all time suspended and respondent on probation, except for a period of ninety (90) days, conditioned on Ligon complying with certain conditions. It appears that Ligon violated his probation by failing to enter into a contract with the N.B.A. Law Practice Assistance program, by failing to attend the N.B.A. Mentoring program, and by failing to provide quarterly reports to the Board.

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Robert Love, a Memphis attorney, was suspended for a period of one year plus an indefinite period thereafter by order entered August 31, 1989. Love was tried before a hearing committee, which found he should remain on indefinite suspension until he has made restitution of $4,300 plus 10% to a client whose insurance settlement check was misappropriated by him.

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William Douglass Love, of Nashville, was suspended for one year plus indefinite suspension by an order of the Supreme Court entered on January 9, 1998. A hearing committee found, and the Supreme Court approved, that Love was retained to represent two clients for traffic offenses. Love advised both clients that they did not need to appear in court as he would handle it; however, Love did not appear in court and did not file a continuance. Both clients received default judgments against them and Love did not correct the situation or refund the clients their already advanced fees. The committee found Love to have violated DR 1-102; DR 6-101 and DR 7-101 and found the following aggravated circumstances: prior offenses, multiple offenses, a pattern of misconduct, vulnerability of victims, and that he had substantial experience in law practice. The indefinite suspension was to be in effect until Love fulfilled the following conditions: restitution to clients and demonstration in a reinstatement proceeding that his is fit, psychologically, to practice law.

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Michael E. Lundy, of Knoxville, was suspended for a minimum of two and one-half (2-1/2) years on April 28, 1995, beginning on September 27, 1994, the date of his temporary suspension.
The suspension arose because of Lundy's misappropriation from an estate of trust funds in excess of $100,000.00. Lundy had also been convicted of a smaller theft of escrow funds. The thefts violated Canon 9, Rule B.
The agreement between Lundy and Disciplinary Counsel requires Lundy to make full restitution to the estates and to have satisfactorily completed his probation before he can apply for reinstatement.

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Ralph Martin, a Chattanooga attorney has been suspended for two years. Martin had previously been disbarred by order entered October 6, 1988, but the court allowed him to argue his appeal in January 1989. On June 19, 1989, the court abrogated the disbarment and suspended Martin for two years, retroactive to October 6, 1988.
Martin misappropriated funds from two clients by cashing settlement checks and not giving the clients their share. He paid both clients with bad checks, causing them to retain attorneys to collect the monies due them. Both clients were eventually made whole. Previous to these ethical violations Martin had been admonished in March 1985 by the Board, for a pattern of writing bad checks and the improper handling of his trust account.

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John Carlin Mask, Jr., of Bolivar, was suspended for thirteen months by an order filed July 5, 1989, however, the suspension was commenced as of the date of his original suspension on February 7, 1987.
Mask was originally suspended for his failure to respond to the Board regarding complaints of ethical misconduct. He was also found to have failed to communicate appropriately with his clients as to the progress and status of their legal matters and with the neglect of several legal matters entrusted to him.

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Kelvin A. Massey, of Memphis, was suspended for five (5) years, retroactively beginning on August 14, 1994, the date Massey was first suspended. Massey is under indefinite suspension until he has made full restitution.

Massey submitted a conditional guilty plea in exchange for a stated form of discipline embracing all pending complaints and he admitted violations of DR 1-102 (A) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6); DR 2-106(A)(B); DR 5-101(A); DR 5-105(A)(B); DR 5-107(A)(B); DR 6-101(A)(1)(2)(3); DR 7-101(A)(1)(2)(3)(4);DR 7-102(A)(1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6)(7)(8); DR 9-102(A)(B) and T.C.A. 23-3-201(3)(5). The order further specified that Massey shall pay the costs of the disciplinary matter as a condition precedent to reinstatement.

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John Van Matthews III, of Fayetteville, was suspended for two years. Mr. Matthews neglected the cases of two different clients, taking virtually no action for either. He did not return the files or unearned fees when requested by his clients. As a condition precedent to any reinstatement, the Court ordered that Mr. Matthews make full restitution to both clients.

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Neal McAlpin, Jr., a Nashville attorney, was suspended by Order entered February 21, 1991. Formal charges were filed and a Hearing Committee found McAlpin should be suspended. His suspension was for a period of one (1) year and for an indefinite period thereafter, ending upon his compliance with conditions imposed against him by a Hearing Committee of the Board of Professional Responsibility.
The Hearing Committee found that in three separate legal matters, McAlpin violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice. He was also found to have neglected legal matters entrusted to him, failed to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing his clients and in certain matters of having prejudiced or damaged his client during the course of the professional relationship.
McAlpin appealed to Chancery Court; the judgment was affirmed. Appeal was taken to the Supreme Court, which also affirmed the judgment.

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Willis Perry McArthur, of Gallatin, was suspended on April 10, 1995. The Court accepted the terms of a Conditional Guilty Plea. McArthur's license will be suspended for four (4) years, retroactive to November 5, 1991, the day his law license was temporarily suspended.

The Suspension Order requires that McArthur complete six (6) hours of legal ethics for the next two (2) years in addition to the three (3) hours of CLE required. He must also submit the names of two experienced attorneys to monitor his practice for two years following the reinstatement and who would be willing to make quarterly reports the first year and semiannually thereafter. He shall also associate with an experienced trial attorney for the next two years and shall not engage in solo practice.

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Frank C. McColm, of Hamilton County, submitted a conditional guilty plea in exchange for a five-year suspension after having failed to remit premiums due to title insurance companies, submitting checks for premiums to title insurance companies which were dishonored, obtaining a discharge in bankruptcy on trust accounts, transferring property subject to a security interest with no notice and removing an automobile subject to a security interest from the State to gain leverage in negotiations with his creditor. The five-year suspension order was entered January 7, 1983.

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Lloyd C. McDougal, of Memphis, was suspended for one year by order entered May 27, 1987, by recommendation of a hearing panel. In 1984, McDougal's law license was suspended for two years. He filed an affidavit with the Court alleging that he had not received notice of the hearing that led to his suspension. A hearing regarding the question of adequate notice was held before a hearing panel, and it was determined that the affidavit was false. At a second hearing, which was held to determine the appropriate discipline, the additional one year suspension was imposed.

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Joyce A. McMonagle, a Memphis attorney, was suspended for one year by Order entered on January 10, 1995. McMonagle failed to appear and represent a client in a homicide case and was reported to the Board by the judge. McMonagle failed to answer the charges in the complaint and was temporarily suspended. McMonagle then failed to respond to the Petition for Discipline and the hearing panel entered a default judgment.

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Thomas R. Meeks, of Clarksville, was suspended for a definite period of two years by order entered April 8, 1987, upon recommendation of a hearing panel. The definite suspension was made consecutive to an interim suspension begun in 1985 when Meeks was convicted in U. S. District Court on a charge that he had knowledge of the commission of a felony which he concealed and failed to report to the appropriate authorities.

In addition to the definite suspension, the Hearing Panel ordered an indefinite consecutive suspension pending Meeks' satisfactory completion of a course in legal ethics at one of the named Tennessee Law Schools.

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Paul Douglas Morrison, of Knoxville, was suspended for two years. The suspension was retroactive to June 1, 1989, when he ceased practicing law. His suspension resulted from his illegal dumping of hazardous waste in Georgia.

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Paul Douglas Morrison, a Knoxville attorney, was suspended for a period of two (2) years by order entered July 19, 1990. He submitted a guilty plea to a Petition for Discipline filed by the Board. Morrison was found to have violated Disciplinary Rules as a result of his illegal dumping of hazardous waste in Georgia.

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Charles D. Mounger, Jr., of Knoxville, was suspended for three years. Mounger neglected the case of his client and allowed a default judgment to be rendered against the client. He also failed to advise his client of the default judgment and misrepresented that the client's case was alive when in fact it was dismissed

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Ira Henderson Murphy, a Memphis lawyer and judge, was suspended for five (5) years by Order entered April 8, 1991. The Supreme Court originally suspended Murphy from the practice of law on July 24, 1986. The final order of the Court found that the extent of his discipline should be a five-year suspension from the practice of law to commence as of the date he was originally suspended in 1986.

Murphy was a Shelby County General Sessions Court Judge when he was indicted and later convicted for mail fraud, obstruction of justice and perjury in the U. S. District Court in Memphis.

Murphy's suspension in 1986 followed his conviction. Formal charges were filed against him by the Board.
Murphy subsequently entered a guilty plea to particular charges brought against him and agreed to a suspension from the practice of law for a period of five (5) years to commence as of July 24, 1986.

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O. V. Myers, Jr., a Nashville attorney, was suspended for five years by order entered on March 8, 1988. Myers tendered a conditional guilty plea which the Board accepted and the Court approved. Meyers had obtained a power of attorney on his father. He then used this power of attorney fraudulently to convert the income and assets of his parents in the approximate amount of $90,000.

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Timothy C. Naifeh, a Dyersburg attorney, was suspended by Order entered March 1, 1993. The suspension was for one (1) year with all time suspended with Naifeh being on probation, except for a period of thirty (30) days, conditioned upon Naifeh complying with certain conditions.
The suspension was pursuant to a conditional guilty plea Naifeh submitted to a Petition for Discipline. The suspension order specifies that Naifeh be evaluated for drug addiction and is to comply with whatever treatment and aftercare program recommended by the treatment center. Naifeh was ordered to have a monitor who would make quarterly reports to the Board for one year regarding Naifeh's compliance with the treatment center's recommendations. Naifeh was also subject to random drug screens.

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Clarence A. Nelson, Jr., an attorney from Las Vegas, Nevada, with a Tennessee license to practice law, was suspended from practice for five years. Nelson was suspended for five years by the U.S. District Court, District of Nevada, for filing fraudulent documents with the Court and concealing assets in his personal bankruptcy proceeding. The Nevada Supreme Court suspended Nelson for five years, and the Board petitioned the Tennessee Supreme Court for reciprocal discipline which was imposed

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Verni O. Nerren, a Memphis attorney, was suspended by order entered December 19, 1990. The suspension is for a definite period of four and one-half (4-1/2) years along with an indefinite period of suspension based upon her compliance with terms and conditions imposed by a Hearing Committee of the Board of Professional Responsibility.
Nerren had been in a suspended status since December 21, 1989, when the Supreme Court ordered her immediate suspension based upon the opinion that she posed a substantial threat irreparable harm to the public, as a practicing lawyer.
The Hearing Committee of the Board conducted the hearing based upon numerous complaints filed against her with the Board. The Judgment of this Hearing Committee found that Nerren failed to exercise competence and zeal on behalf of her clients; that she neglected legal matters entrusted to her; that her conduct was prejudicial to the administration of justice and that she failed to manifest an understanding and appreciation of her responsibilities as an attorney. Nerren appealed the judgment and the designated judge dismissed the appeal.

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Peter L. Niles, of Daytona Beach, Florida, also licensed to practice in Tennessee, was suspended on August 16, 1995 for one (1) year.

Niles was suspended in Florida on October 27, 1994 for one year in Florida Bar vs. Peter L. Niles. Pursuant to Rule 9, Section 17, Reciprocal Discipline Rule, Niles was also suspended in Tennessee.

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Elliott Ozment, of Nashville, consented to a suspension of four months for failing to maintain clients' funds in an escrow or trust account separate from his personal funds. No client incurred any loss of funds.

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John Ben Pectol, a Dayton attorney, was suspended for two (2) years by order entered November 26, 1991. The Supreme Court of Tennessee approved a decision of a Hearing Panel of the Board in recommending said suspension after a full hearing.

The Hearing Panel found that Pectol was guilty of the following ethical violations:

Pectol failed to adequately communicate with various clients and keep them reasonably informed; failed to provide clients with their files when they requested them; failed to timely and zealously pursue three divorce petitions he filed; failed to appear at hearings and depositions in his client's cases; failed to file or unreasonably delayed filing answers, responses to interrogatories, orders or other pleadings required by the courts; failed to file briefs and/or transcripts required by court rules on appeals in criminal and civil matters; and failed to properly abide by Appellate Rules of Procedure.

Pectol also carelessly, neglectfully or non-timely advised his clients; was advised to amend pleadings and failed to do so; represented estates and conservatorship and failed to file the required accountings timely; refused to enter a court order when requested to do so by the court solely because he allegedly had not been paid his fees; did not complete his representation of a client but attempted to charge a full fee for work; did not adequately protect and safeguard monies held in trust by him; has received monies from his clients with the intent that he deliver said monies to third parties and failed to timely deliver said monies; commingled client funds with personal/office funds; failed to zealously and diligently petition the court to transfer his client monies held by the courts on his clients' behalf or to have said monies transferred to an interest-bearing account; made misrepresentations, false statements or deceitful comments to his clients; and made misrepresentations to the court.

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John Ben Pectol, a Dayton attorney, was suspended for two years by order entered January 18, 1995. Pectol was convicted in U.S. District Court for failure to file income tax. Prior to the instant discipline, Pectol's law license had been suspended for two years as a result of other violations of the Code. The suspension on the income tax charges was ordered to be concurrent with the prior suspension. This new suspension resulted from a settlement agreement between Disciplinary Counsel and Pectol.

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Hugh Rainey Pegram, a Jackson attorney, was suspended for one year by Order entered on April 2, 1993. A hearing panel found that Pegram neglected a legal matter, failed to communicate with his clients, and deceived his clients about the status of their matter. In another legal matter, Pegram failed and refused to communicate with his client or to return the client's documents after he was discharged as attorney. Pegram further failed to respond to inquiries from the Board.

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James M. Piedra, of Murfreesboro, was suspended from practice for a period of one year and one day by judgment of a Hearing Panel and order of the Supreme Court filed on September 1, 1983. His suspension resulted from abandonment of his law practice, failure to protect his clients' interests, and failure to communicate with one of his clients, resulting in a dismissal with prejudice of the client's suit.

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Curtis Pigram, a Memphis attorney, was suspended for a period of two years by order entered August 31, 1989. The hearing committee found that he was to make restitution to certain clients for fees advanced to him for legal services. He was required to seek professional treatment for his cocaine addiction. Hospitalization and other inpatient treatment was recommended. He was found to have misappropriated funds entrusted to him, and had a course of conduct of obtaining fees from clients for services and not rendering such services in order to finance his cocaine habit.

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Thomas M. Privette, Jr., Shelby County, tendered a plea of guilty in exchange for a three-year suspension following his convictions of unlawful possession of cocaine and improperly influencing the testimony of a witness. The tendered plea was submitted directly to the Board and approved without the intervention of a hearing panel. The Supreme Court entered the three-year suspension on June 26, 1980.

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David J. Poss, of Knox County, was suspended for one year, with all time suspended except for a thirty-day period beginning December 10, 1997 and ending January 10, 1998. The Respondent plead guilty to violating DR 1-102 and DR 2-106 in exchange for the one year suspension with the condition that no court or the Board of Professional Responsibility would find him in violation of the Code during that one year suspension. Should a finding be made that Poss is in violation of the Code during that one year period, Poss' probation will be immediately revoked and his suspension for the entire period of one year will be imposed. Poss was charged with submitting fee petitions to the State of Tennessee as payment for his representation in indigent criminal defense cases.

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Robert L. Randall, Jr., a Jonesborough attorney, was suspended for five (5) years by Order filed April 29, 1993. The suspension was retroactive to October 21, 1992, when his law license was temporarily suspended. A Petition for Discipline was filed against Randall alleging conversion of trust funds to his personal use. A review of his trust account indicated commingling of public and trust funds as well as checks returned for insufficient funds. Randall submitted a conditional guilty plea to the Petition.

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Billy J. Reed, a Knoxville attorney, was suspended for one (1) year by Order entered on September 18, 1991. The suspension was retroactive to August 20, 1990.
Reed's law license was temporarily suspended on August 20, 1990, for failing to respond to complaints filed against him. The complaints indicated a pattern of neglect and failure to adequately communicate with his clients. A Petition for Discipline was filed and Reed submitted a conditional guilty plea. The plea was approved by a Hearing Panel of the Board.

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David C. Reiner, formerly of Nashville, was suspended for three years as a result of a single instance of neglect of a legal matter. He neglected to pursue a cause of action on behalf of a client regarding a dispute over the purchase of an automobile. He never filed any pleadings on behalf of the client, never communicated with the client or gave notice of motions for default, allowing default judgments to be entered. The client's first knowledge of the judgments came when they were served with a garnishment. They filed a malpractice suit against him and obtained a judgment by default in the amount of $5,000, which remains unsatisfied.

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R. Jackson Rose, an attorney of Knoxville and Tazewell, Tennessee, had his license suspended on March 1, 1989. Rose was convicted in federal court of violating Title 18, Section 371, U.S.C.A., "Conspiracy to provide assistance and protection from law enforcement action to carry out an illegal gambling business." This conviction related to an FBI investigation in Claiborne County regarding illegal gambling that ultimately led to the conviction of the Claiborne County sheriff. Rose had pled guilty to the offense that he "did willfully, knowingly, intentionally and without authority combine, conspire, confederate and agree with another to commit an offense against the United States . . . by obstructing and affecting commerce and the movement of articles and commodities in commerce by obtaining property, that is, the sum of $18,450.00 under color of official right."

Shortly after his guilty plea on September 25, 1986, Rose's license was summarily suspended pursuant to Section 14.9, Rule 9. A hearing committee conducted a hearing and recommended a three-year suspension. Rose appealed to the Claiborne County Circuit Court which affirmed the hearing panel's decision.

The Supreme Court affirmed the orders of the hearing panel and circuit court. The suspension was made retroactive to September 25, 1986.

On July 3, 1989, Rose was reinstated to practice law.

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Robert C. Rosenbush, of Shelby County, was suspended for a period of two years by order entered on August 13, 1981, after a hearing panel found that he had accepted a legal matter and then failed to act and falsely assured the client that the suit had been filed. The hearing panel noted that Rosenbush had been given a public censure in March 1980 for neglecting an estate matter wherein he made false assurances to his client that he had taken certain actions when in fact he had not done so.

The Supreme Court subsequently on December 7, 1981, found Rosenbush in contempt for willfully continuing to practice law in violation of the suspension order and ordered him incarcerated in the Shelby County jail for ten days.
On November 19, 1987, Rosenbush was reinstated to practice law.

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Edward A. Sadler, Jr., a Nashville attorney, was suspended for a period of (1) one year beginning November 2, 1990.
The suspension occurred after Sadler entered a guilty plea to three petitions for discipline filed as to him.
The petitions set forth a pattern of neglect in the cases of various clients. His neglect included failing to adequately communicate with clients, failing to file briefs, failing to timely comply with discovery requests, allowing cases to be dismissed for want of prosecution, failing to file requested lawsuits, and failing to appear at hearings.

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Carter H. Schoolfield, of Hamilton County, was suspended on February 21, 1979, for five years for actions in not diligently representing clients and not disclosing his failures to act in their behalf and in leading them to believe that he was taking care of their interests. Respondent had been previously suspended for seven and one-half months for similar instances of misconduct.

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Harry U. Scruggs, Jr., and Harry U. Scruggs, Sr., of Shelby County, were found guilty of aiding and abetting with a co-defendant in possessing money stolen from a bank in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2113(c) and obstructing information to criminal investigators in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1510. The father was fined $500 on each count and the son was sentenced to one year and a day on each count to run concurrently. Each respondent was immediately suspended from practice upon the conviction. The convictions were appealed and affirmed and a petition to determine final discipline was filed. The final discipline imposed upon the father was a suspension from practice for three months, and the final discipline imposed upon the son was suspension from practice for one year and a day. The father was not required to seek reinstatement pursuant to Rule 9. The son petitioned for reinstatement, which was denied by the hearing panel, and that decision was appealed to the Circuit Court of Shelby County, and sustained and later appealed to the Supreme Court whereupon Mr. Scruggs, Jr. was reinstated after showing evidence of rehabilitation.

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Walter T. Searcy III, a Nashville attorney, was suspended for five (5) years by Order entered October 14, 1992. The suspension to be retroactive to February 20, 1992. Disciplinary Counsel, acting on authority of the Board of Professional Responsibility, filed a Petition for Discipline, a Supplemental Petition for Discipline, a Second Supplemental Petition for Discipline, a Third Supplemental Petition for Discipline, and a Fourth Supplemental Petition for Discipline against Searcy.

Searcy submitted a conditional guilty plea in exchange for a stated form of discipline or punishment. The guilty plea and stated form of discipline embraced all pending complaints.

The suspension order specifies that Searcy shall make restitution to all complainants for any valid claims, including any additional complainants whose claims arise out of Searcy's conduct in his practice of law prior to entry of the-final order in this cause, as a condition precedent to reinstatement of his license. The suspension further orders that Searcy shall make restitution for any judgment or valid claim arising from his conduct in his law practice prior to the entry of any final order in the matter, as a condition precedent to reinstatement.

The suspension order further specifies that Searcy shall attend continuing legal education, with at least twelve hours in ethics of professional conduct with hours sufficient to be in compliance with CLE requirements as a condition precedent to reinstatement of his license to practice law.

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Donald C. Seeling, a lawyer who maintained an office in Knoxville, Chattanooga and Morristown, was suspended for two years by Order entered on October 18, 1994. Seeling abandoned his practice in Morristown without adequate notice to his clients and without completing his clients, cases. Seeling did not respond to a Petition for Discipline filed against him and a default judgment was granted. The hearing panel recommended a two-year suspension.

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Barrett Holt Shoaf, an attorney in Gibson County, was suspended by Order filed May 25, 1993. The suspension was for one year plus an indefinite period until he makes restitution for his neglect in the amount of $10,000. Shoaf responded to interrogatories filed by the adverse party but failed to disclose the identity of an eyewitness. The critical witness was not allowed to testify and the case, which was one of clear liability, was dismissed. Shoaf appealed the case but the appeal was dismissed due to his neglect. Before the trial Shoaf received a settlement offer but he failed to convey the offer to his client.

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Joe A. Sigman, of Memphis, was suspended from the practice of law for three (3) years on November 14, 1996, as a result of his violations of DR 1-102(A)(1) (4)(5)(6); DR 2-106(A)(B); DR 2-110(A)(2)(3); DR 5-105(A)(B); DR 6-101(A)(3); DR 7-101(A)(1)(2)(3)(4); DR 9-102(A); and DR 9-102(B)(1)(2)(3)(4).

As a result of seven complaints filed against Mr. Sigman, three petitions for discipline were filed. A hearing panel heard the evidence and recommended that he be suspended for three years and ordered him to reimburse two clients.
Sigman's ethical violations included failing to communicate with his clients; neglecting his clients, cases; failing to return clients' files; making misrepresentations to clients' failure to safeguard clients, retainers; charging excessive fees; failure to respond to the Board of Professional Responsibility, and engaging in a conflict of interest by representing both the plaintiff and defendant in the same action.

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Marshall Scott Smith, of Memphis, was suspended for eighteen months. Mr. Smith had been paid fees and costs by a number of clients for legal services but neglected their cases and then abandoned his clients and their causes.
The Supreme Court ordered that he should not be reinstated to the practice of law in this state until he has made restitution to the persons to whom money is owed and those who filed complaints against him with the Board.

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Todd Graham Smith, of Davidson County, was suspended for one year by an order entered January 26, 1998. A hearing was held on September 23, 1997 in which Smith did not appear. The hearing panel found that Smith's failure to respond to the Board's inquiry regarding an overdraft of his trust account despite numerous notices and requests subjected him to a summary suspension. The Board also found that it appeared that Smith had misappropriated trust funds for his personal use in violation of DR 1-102; DR 9102 and T.C.A. § 23-3-201(3) and (5). The Supreme Court approved the findings of the panel and found that before reinstatement, Smith would have to attend an educational class on trust accounting.

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Wade F. Smith, an attorney in the Knoxville area, had his license suspended for eighteen months on February 8, 1989. He had been temporarily suspended since November 23, 1987, and this suspension was made retroactive to that date.
Smith represented a client in a criminal matter. He failed to keep in contact with his client and failed to provide him with a copy of his transcript as requested. He similarly failed to communicate with another client in a criminal matter.

Smith also failed to provide a written response to the complaints filed against him. Disciplinary Counsel filed a petition for discipline against Smith regarding these matters. Smith failed to file an answer or to appear at his disciplinary hearing. The hearing panel recommended the suspension which was approved by the Court.

Should Smith ever apply for reinstatement, the Court required that he not only meet the requirements of Supreme Court Rule 9, but that he also have completed an ethics course, provide a medical certificate stating that he is in good physical and mental health, and provide Affidavits from five attorneys that he possesses good moral character.

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Walter H. Stephenson II, of Nashville, was suspended for a period of three years as a result of neglect and misrepresentation as to the status of clients' matters in six separate instances. A pattern of neglect and deceit was found to exist. On January 8, 1988, Stephenson was reinstated to practice.

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Thomas Harold Strawn, Jr., of Tullahoma and Nashville, was suspended for five years, by order entered October 6, 1986. His guilty plea was accepted by the Board, and the suspension was made retroactive to February 25, 1986, the date of Strawn's conviction by a jury on charges involving bank fraud related to his activity while president of a bank in Tullahoma. In one case, he misapplied bank money by lending money to others when he and another man were the true undisclosed beneficiaries of the loan. In a second case he conspired with an official of another bank to exchange unsecured loans and to misapply bank funds. He was sentenced by the U. S. District Court to four years in each case, with the sentences being served consecutively.

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William P. Sutherland, of Davidson County, was suspended for five years beginning retroactively on February 16, 1993 for his conviction of serious crimes. Sutherland was convicted of a felony for theft of property in September of 1992 and bank fraud in June of 1993. The Supreme Court directed the Board to determine his final discipline, upon which Sutherland submitted a conditional guilty plea to the Board. He was found guilty of violating DR 1-102; DR 7-101; and DR 9-102. The Supreme Court considered his serious, progressive, and chronic mental illness to be a mitigating factor but did require him to make minimum monthly payments of $500 to the victims.

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Henry Von Sutton, of Memphis, was suspended for eighteen months beginning retroactively on June 12, 1996 - his original suspension date. Sutton submitted a conditional guilty plea, acknowledging his violation of DR 1-102;DR 2-110;DR 6-101;DR 7-101;DR 9-102 and T.C.A.23-3-201 (3) and (5). The suspension order requires Sutton to reimburse Rae Nell Scott $3,000, reimburse the costs and expenses of the disciplinary proceeding, reimburse the Lawyers Fund for Client Protection for any and all sums paid on his behalf, and to enter into a contract with Lawyers Helping Lawyers Committee Inc. for eighteen months. Additionally, Sutton is required to have a monitor with the above listed Lawyers Committee whose duty, is to make quarterly reports to the Board for the duration of the contract. Each of these requirements must be fulfilled as a condition precedent to reinstatement.

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Paul Richard Talley, of Morristown, was suspended for two years upon a guilty plea stating that he went uninvited into the home of a prospective client at the request of the prospective client's sister, and accepted employment in the matter. Thereafter, he failed to withdraw from representation after being discharged by the client. On December 17, 1987, Talley was reinstated to practice law.

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Paul E. Terry, a Nashville attorney, was suspended by Order entered on March 1, 1994. The suspension was for one year plus an indefinite suspension until Terry satisfies the amount owed the Complainant, either by agreement or a judgment. A Petition for Discipline alleged Terry failed to refund unearned fees, advanced or guaranteed financial assistance to his clients, neglected legal matters, failed to act with reasonable diligence and promptness, failed to keep his clients reasonably informed, and failed to preserve his clients' funds and failed to maintain complete records and promptly deliver funds and securities to clients when requested. Terry submitted a Conditional Guilty Plea to the Petition for Discipline.

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Al H. Thomas, of Memphis, was suspended by order entered January 27, 1992. Formal charges were filed against Thomas and a hearing was held. The Hearing Committee found a suspension to be appropriate. The suspension was for a period of thirty (30) days and an indefinite consecutive period of time ending upon his compliance with certain conditions.

The sanction imposed against Thomas resulted from his misconduct in administering trust funds which he held as trustee for his clients. Thomas's absence of a prior disciplinary record was considered a mitigating circumstance; Thomas's substantial experience in the practice of law for over thirty-six years and the vulnerability of victims were considered aggravating circumstances; Thomas's indifference to making restitution, evidenced by the fact that he did not reaffirm the debt or protect the trustors in the event of his death until sued for non-dischargeability of the debt in bankruptcy court, was considered an aggravating circumstance; Thomas's motivation to provide his client with a monthly income was found to be a mitigating circumstance; the fact that Thomas made monthly payments to his client for more than eleven years, even during the entire bankruptcy period, was found to be a mitigating circumstance as well as his effort to exclude the indebtedness to the trust from the bankruptcy filing and his reaffirmation of the debt to the trust.

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Albert R. Thompson, Sr., a Memphis attorney, was suspended for a period of three years by order entered on March 8, 1989. This suspension resulted from several incidents of misconduct.

As a real estate closing attorney Thompson received funds to be disbursed which he held for approximately four months. He then issued his escrow check which was dishonored due to his account being overdrawn. There were other incidents of checks written on his escrow account over approximately a one-year period which were dishonored due to his account being overdrawn. In another matter Thompson received a $1000 retainer fee to represent a client in a criminal matter and then failed to render legal services.

The hearing panel recommended the three-year suspension after finding that Thompson's misconduct was aggravated by his failure to respond to the disciplinary complaints and failure to respond to the Board's formal charges of misconduct.

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Almose A. Thompson, a Nashville attorney, was suspended for two years retroactive to June 10, 1993, by Order dated January 11, 1994. Thompson submitted a guilty plea to a Petition for Discipline. The guilty plea encompassed 26 complaints involving neglect and failure to communicate with clients. Thompson was ordered to attend nine additional hours of CLE in the area of law office management. He further was ordered to make restitution for any judgment or valid claim arising from his conduct in his law practice.

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Frank Thompson-McLeod, of Nashville, on September 19, 1996, was suspended from the practice of law for one year, the suspension being retroactive to November 8, 1995, the date he was first suspended by the Supreme Court. His suspension was the result of his conviction by a guilty plea to a crime of compounding.
Thompson-McLeod filed a conditional guilty plea in which he admitted his guilt of violating T.C.A. 39-16-604 and DR 1-102(A)(1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6) and T.C.A. 23-3-201(l)(5) in exchange for a stated form of discipline. The Supreme Court accepted and approved the guilty plea by entering an order suspending Thompson-McLeod for one (1) year retroactive to November 8, 1995, the date he was first suspended. The court also ordered that he take six (6) additional hours of CLE in ethics in addition to the required hours of CLE ethics. The court further ordered that Thompson-McLeod pay the cost of the disciplinary proceedings as a condition precedent to reinstatement.

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James K. Traughber, of Robertson County, was suspended from the practice of law for one year plus an indefinite period for several acts of misconduct. He was employed and paid a retainer fee in a divorce matter and only appeared one time at a pendente lite child support hearing. Thereafter the client was unable to locate Respondent and his office was constantly closed. In another matter Respondent appeared in Court on behalf of a client when he had obviously been drinking. He further failed to make court appearances when at least two clients were arraigned on criminal cases. Respondent also failed to appear and comply with a show cause order and to explain his fee as disclosed on his statement of attorney for a client in a bankruptcy matter.

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Etrula R. Trotter, a Memphis attorney, was suspended for a period of two (2) years and nine (9) months by Order entered December 27, 1991. This suspension was retroactive to November 21, 1989. The Board filed a Petition for Discipline and a Supplemental Petition for Discipline against Trotter. She submitted a conditional guilty plea in exchange for a stated form of discipline or punishment. The guilty plea and stated form of punishment embraced four pending complaints involving negligence, failure to communicate with her clients and misrepresentation.

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Helen Trout, a Knoxville attorney, was suspended for five years by order filed on March 22, 1989. Trout did not answer the formal charges filed against her and did not appear at the hearing. A default judgment was granted and the hearing panel recommended the five-year suspension. The Supreme Court approved this recommendation.
Nine separate complaints were involved in the disciplinary proceedings. Trout handled a real estate matter and converted $1880 to her personal use.

Trout was retained to represent a client regarding problems with her car. Trout neglected the matter, failed to communicate with her, and failed to return her file.

Trout represented clients in a lawsuit which they had pending. She neglected their case, failed to communicate with them, and lied to them about when their case was set for trial.

Trout handled a real estate closing for a client and Freedlander Mortgage. She failed to pay Freedlander the $1714.87 owed to it, failed to pay the back taxes on the property as provided in the closing, and to record the deed. She also commingled trust funds with her personal funds.

Trout, in handling another real estate closing, failed to record the deed and falsely advised that the deed had been recorded. She received $353 at the closing to pay for a termite treatment, but failed to pay for it.

Trout handled a closing for a church. As part of that closing, she was charged with paying some monies to the Veterans Administration. She delayed in making these payments until the VA threatened foreclosure, even though she had the monies in her bank account for a considerable time.

Trout represented another client in a land dispute and a divorce. She neglected the case and failed to communicate with her client. She also neglected other clients' civil matter and failed to communicate with them.

On November 6, 1987, Trout's law license was suspended for her failure to pay the registration fee required by Rule 9. Trout continued to practice law after that suspension.

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D. Michael Van Sant, of Davidson County, was suspended for ninety days beginning on February 26, 1997. He was suspended for failing to file an appellate brief with the Court of Criminal Appeals on behalf of his client. The Court held him in contempt and found him in violation of DR 1-102; DR 6-101; DR 7-101; and DR 7-106. Van Sant entered a conditional guilty plea with the Board. The Supreme Court accepted and approved the plea and his temporarily suspension for failing to respond to the disciplinary complaint merged into the above suspension.

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Gregory H. Vann, of Clarksville, was suspended for one year by order entered August 29, 1986, upon the recommendation of a hearing panel. He was found guilty of allowing the statute of limitations to expire on his client's legal matter involving injuries sustained in an automobile accident.

Aggravating circumstances involved his failure to cooperate with the Board during the investigation of the matter and his fraud in misrepresenting the status of the legal matter to his firm and to his client.

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Larry J. Waters, of Millington, was suspended on January 16, 1996. Waters submitted a conditional guilty plea admitting violations of DR 1102(A)(1)(4)(5)(6); DR 6-101(A)(1)(2)(3); DR 7-101(A)(1)(2)(3)(4) and T.C.A. 23-3-201(5).
The order stipulated that Waters be suspended for a definite suspension of one (1) year plus an indefinite suspension until restitution is made in accordance with any final judgment in the case Billie J. Metcalfe, Julia M. Metcalfe and Johnny D. Metcalfe V. Larry J. Waters, Charles W. Pruitt and The Law Office of Pruitt and Waters, Civil Action No. 58018-8 T.D. in the Circuit Court of Shelby County.

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Arthur N. Welhoelter, of Nashville, was suspended on June 23, 1995. Welhoelter entered a Conditional Guilty Plea for a three and one-half (3-1/2) years suspension retroactive to January 22, 1992, the date he voluntarily ceased the practice of law.
Welhoelter admitted he had violated DR 1-102(A)(1)(4)(5) and (6); DR 7-102(A)(8) and DR 9-102(A) in the Conditional Guilty Plea. These violations occurred because Welhoelter handled his firm's trust account improperly.
Mitigating circumstances are that Welhoelter reported his own misconduct and made full disclosure of the circumstances. He also made restitution for the consequences of his misconduct.

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Thomas Davidson Williams, of Memphis, was suspended for five years. The suspension resulted from Williams' three instances of neglect of legal matters and four instances of misappropriation of client or estate funds totaling approximately $68,000.

Williams was placed on a temporary suspension from the practice of law on November 30, 1983, when the Supreme Court found that his immediate suspension was necessary due to the public harm caused by his misappropriation of funds to his own use. The temporary suspension remained in effect until May 6, 1985, when the Court entered the order calling for a five-year suspension.

Williams acknowledged the allegations against him and alleged that his misconduct was the result of mental and emotional illness.

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Thomas H. Williams, Jr., of Nashville, was suspended from practice for eighteen months following his guilty plea which was approved by the Hearing Panel, the Board, and the Court. The Hearing Panel found that Williams failed to act competently in representing certain clients, that he commingled client's funds into his personal account, resulting in no damages to his client, and that he engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.

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Charles G. Wright, Jr., of Hamilton County, was suspended on November 20, 1978, for six months by the Supreme Court after his appeal of the determination of the trial court and hearing panel. Respondent advised his client to disregard a restraining order and proceeded to take a default judgment and final decree of divorce without notice to opposing counsel, or the Court, that his client's spouse had also filed a divorce action in another division of the court. In another matter, Respondent failed to file a motion to restore the action to the docket after it had been dismissed by one Chancellor and failed to divulge to the other Chancellor that application to appoint a conservator had been twice denied. This decision is reported in 573 S.W.2d 463. In September 1979, Mr. Wright was reinstated pursuant to Rule 9 (19).

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