STATE OF MINNESOTA AND BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD OF MINNESOTA,
    PLAINTIFFS,

    V. 

    PHILIP MORRIS, INC., ET. AL., 
    DEFENDANTS.


    TOPIC:          TRIAL TRANSCRIPT
            TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
    DOCKET-NUMBER:  C1-94-8565
    VENUE:          Minnesota District Court, Second Judicial District, Ramsey
    County.
    YEAR:           March 6, 1998
            A.M. Session

    JUDGE:          Hon. Judge Kenneth J. Fitzpatrick, Chief Judge

    THE CLERK: All rise. Ramsey County District Court is again in session, the
    Honorable Kenneth J. Fitzpatrick now presiding.
            (Jury enters the courtroom.)
        THE CLERK: Please be seated.
        THE COURT: Counsel.
        MR. CIRESI: Thank you, Your Honor.
        Good morning, ladies and gentlemen.
            (Collective "Good morning.")
        ANDREW J. SCHINDLER called as a witness, being previously sworn, was
    examined and testified as follows:
    BY MR. CIRESI:
        Q. Good morning, Mr. Schindler.
        A. Good morning.
        Q. Sir, can you direct your attention to Exhibit 14303, which would be
    in volume two. It's toward the front, sir.
        A. Yes.
        Q. Now sir, you would agree that if smokers are addicted, that their
    free choice would be impaired; correct?
        A. If they were. But I don't believe they're addicted. I believe they
    have free choice to start smoking, and I believe they have free choice to
    quit smoking.
        Q. And direct your attention to Exhibit 14303, which is a memorandum to
    Mr. Kloepfer from Mr. Knopick of The Tobacco Institute. Have you seen this
    document before?
        A. I don't believe I've seen this particular document.
        Q. It's dated September 9th, 1980; correct?
        A. Yes, sir.
        Q. And you'll see in the first paragraph that Mr. Knopick is attaching
    a technical review of the conference of the National Institute of Drug
    Abuse, which wanted "addictive" attached -- added to the cigarette warning.
    Do you see that?
        A. Yes, I do.
        Q. Do you know who Shook, Hardy is?
        A. They're a law firm.
        Q. Represents the tobacco industry?
        A. Yes. I believe -- I believe they represent Philip Morris.
        Q. And have they represented RJR in the past?
        A. Not to my knowledge.
        Q. Have they represented the Tobacco Institute?
        A. I do not know for sure. I do not have specific knowledge that they
    did.
        Q. Okay. You do know that The Tobacco Institute is supported in part by
    RJR.
        A. Of course.
        Q. Okay. Can you turn to the second page, sir. I'd like to direct your
    attention to the sentence starting "Shook, Hardy...." Do you see that?
        A. Yes, sir.
        Q. "Shook, Hardy reminds us, I'm told, that the entire matter of
    addiction is the most potent weapon a prosecuting attorney can have in a
    lung cancer/cigarette case. We can't defend continued smoking as 'free
    choice' if the person was 'addicted."' Do you see that?
        *2 A. Yes, I do.
        Q. And you do know that the internal memoranda of RJR that we reviewed
    yesterday dealt with the pharmacological, addictive nature of nicotine; do
    you not?
        A. We had a lot of documents yesterday. I recall, I guess, some of them
    -- or one of them talking about pharmacological effect. I don't recall
    "pharmacological addictive effect."
        Q. Do you recall that it was part of the Teague memo talking about the
    industry being a specialized segment of the pharmaceutical industry?
        A. I recall Dr. Teague's personal opinion and theory.
        Q. Do you remember Dr. DiMarco's memorandum?
        A. Are you talking about one to Dr. DiMarco?
        Q. Yes.
        A. I remember there was a document yesterday to Dr. DiMarco.
        Q. Do you remember the McKenzie document, Exhibit 12270?
        A. Well I -- I remember a document that had John McKenzie's name on it,
    yes.
        Q. Do you remember the REST memo?
        A. Yes, I remember the REST memo.
        Q. Now yesterday you said you couldn't recall what your superior, Mr.
    Goldstone, said when he testified in Congress regarding the addictive
    nature of nicotine; correct?
        A. I did not have a precise literal remembrance of exactly what he
    said, you know, whatever -- month or so ago, but I had a rough idea of what
    he said.
        Q. And your rough idea was that he testified that nicotine was
    addictive; correct?
        A. My rough remembrance of that was that if you classify -- if the
    definition for addiction is a habit, then he would say it was addictive
    under that definition, is what I remember.
        MR. CIRESI: May I approach, Your Honor?
        THE COURT: Yes.
        MR. WEBER: Is that predesignated?
        MR. CIRESI: It's to refresh his recollection, counsel.
        MR. WEBER: Your Honor, I object to the use of anything that hasn't been
    predesignated.
        It has been? I thought he just said -- let me --
        Can I just check for a minute, Your Honor?
        MR. CIRESI: We're only using it at this point to refresh his
    recollection, Your Honor.
        MR. WEBER: It was predesignated, Your Honor.
        THE COURT: Thank you.
    BY MR. CIRESI:
        Q. This is a document that's in evidence, sir, it's Exhibit 24299, the
    transcript of the proceedings of January 29th, 1998 before Chairman
    Representative Thomas Bliley from Virginia.
        Do you recall that Mr. Goldstone testified on that day?
        A. Sure do.
        Q. And you recall that the CEOs of the various tobacco companies were
    asked whether or not nicotine was addictive?
        A. Yes.
        Q. And you do know that in 1994 the CEO of RJR testified that tobacco
    was not addictive; correct?
        A. He --
        Yes, I recall that. I have to see his testimony.
        Q. Okay. In fact the CEOs of every one of the tobacco companies lined
    up in a row, put their arms up, swore to tell the truth, and said tobacco
    is not addictive in 1994; correct?
        A. I believe that's true, yeah.
        Q. And that was six years after the Surgeon General found tobacco and
    cigarettes to be addictive; correct?
        A. Yes.
        Q. Are you aware of any definitional changes by any health organization
    between 1994 and 1998 regarding the addictive nature of tobacco?
        *3 A. No, not that I'm familiar with.
        Q. Can you direct your attention to page 65 of Exhibit 24299.
        A. I'm sorry, what page was that?
        Q. Sixty-five. You'll find it at the top, sir.
        A. Yeah, I got it. I'm on page 65.
        Q. And at the bottom, you see that Represented -- Representative
    Degette -- excuse me --
        A. Yes.
        Q. -- is starting to ask some questions?
        A. Yes.
        Q. And he states as follows: "The first area I want to talk about is
    this. Four years ago tobacco company executives came before this committee
    and under oath like you were asked the question, is nicotine addictive?
    Each of those executives responded the same, under oath, that nicotine was
    not addictive.
        "I'd like to ask each of you the same question: Is nicotine addictive?"
        And then he says, "I'd like to start with Mr. Brooks," who's the CEO of
    Brown & Williamson.
        If you go over to the next page, I want to direct your attention down
    to Mr. Goldstone's response on page 66.
        MR. WEBER: Your Honor, I object on this and ask for the rule of
    completeness that we begin a little bit -- few lines above so we can get
    the entire context of the discussion. It was a panel set of answers. I'd
    suggest we begin with Mr. Brooke's comments a few lines up on page 66 for
    completeness purposes.
        MR. CIRESI: Well, Your Honor, I'm asking about Mr. Goldstone at this
    point. If we want to talk about Mr. Brookes, then we'll get to him when we
    get to Brown & Williamson.
        THE COURT: I think it's appropriate that we relate to the testimony of
    Mr. Goldstone. Mr. Brookes is a completely different issue.
        MR. WEBER: But my only point on that, Your Honor, was that the
    questions were following each other and there's a context there. But I -- I
    can deal with that later.
        THE COURT: Sure.
    BY MR. CIRESI:
        Q. See where Mr. Goldstone says, "Yes, I think under the way people use
    the term today, I agree, it is." Do you see that?
        A. Yes.
        Q. Now, there were no definitional changes that you're aware of between
    1994 and 1988 -- '98 regarding addiction; were there, sir?
        A. No.
        Q. There were none between 1988 and 1998; were there, that you're aware
    of?
        A. I believe --
        My understanding is there was a definitional change in ninety --
    nineteen ninety -- 1988 relative to the 1964 Surgeon General's report.
        Q. You mean the Surgeon General in 1988 found nicotine addictive and
    with a similar pharmacological effect as cocaine and heroin? Is that what
    you're saying?
        A. No. I'm saying that I believe -- it was my understanding that the
    Surgeon General had a different definition in 1988 for addiction than the
    Surgeon General had in 1964, and that's when in the '88 Surgeon General's
    report that they said it was addictive. It was a definitional change.
        Q. Well, what definitional change are you referring to, if you know?
        A. Well, I believe in, you know, 1964, the Surgeon General, in the
    definition of addiction in those days, referred to things such as
    intoxication, an ever-increasing demand for the product, that withdrawal or
    ceasing to use the particular drug or product frequently required
    hospitalization, that use of it became debilitating, you could lose your
    job, become socially dysfunctional. That is my understanding of the term of
    addiction back in '64, in that period of time. That is what people refer to
    as the classical definition of addiction. It's certainly the one I grew up
    with, or my understanding of it. And in 1988 I believe there were changes
    that basically altered how that was defined, and suddenly intoxication and
    those types of things were not required, that -- that it's sort of if
    something is a habit that people enjoy that may be difficult to give up,
    that you're in a -- in a broader class -- broader definition of addiction.
    And under those terms, if it's a habit that some people might enjoy that
    some people might have difficulty giving up, I would say if that's the
    definition of addiction, that cigarette smoking would certainly meet that.
    But if the definition of addiction is one of intoxication, of risk of
    losing your job, socially dysfunctional, needing to be committed to an
    institution to get off the use of the product, I don't believe cigarettes
    meet that definition. That's heroin, cocaine, alcoholics. And I just don't
    believe that cigarettes meet that definition of addiction.
        *4 Q. Okay. In 1964 did the Surgeon General rely on the World Health
    Organization's definition? If you know.
        A. I'm not sure.
        Q. In nineteen sixty --
        Subsequent to 1964, within a short period of time, did the World Health
    Organization definition change, if you know?
        A. I do not know.
        Q. Pardon me?
        A. I do not know.
        Q. Did RJR turn over its internal documents to the Surgeon General at
    any time between 1964 and 1998?
        A. I have no knowledge.
        Q. Do you know if the definition for addiction includes physiological
    effects and psycological effects?
        A. I suspect it does.
        Q. Do you know if everybody who's on cocaine has to be hospitalized?
        A. No, I don't know that.
        Q. Do you know that smokers who are trying to quit smoking have to be
    hospitalized in some instances?
        A. I don't know that. I've never known a smoker who wanted to quit
    smoking who was hospitalized.
        Q. Have you read Dr. Hurt's testimony in this case?
        A. No, I haven't.
        Q. If smokers have to be hospitalized, then they fit one of the
    criteria you just mentioned; is that correct, sir?
        A. They would. I've never known anybody to be hospitalized to give up
    smoking. Forty some million people have given up smoking; I don't believe
    40 some million people have gone to hospitals to give up smoking.
        Q. Do you think everybody who's been on cocaine or heroin has been
    hospitalized to give up it?
        A. I don't think everybody is, but I'll bet there have been more
    cocaine addicts go to hospitals to get off of their dependency than there
    have been cigarette smokers.
        Q. Have you done a study on that?
        A. Pardon me?
        Q. Have you done a study on that?
        A. No, but I'd bet on it.
        Q. Have you had the company do any type of study on that?
        A. Absolutely not.
        Q. Have you had the company do any type of study as to how many people
    who are on the addiction of smoking have to seek help from professionals in
    order to quit?
        A. To be hospitalized?
        Q. Yes.
        A. I have --
        We've done no study to find out how many people have been hospitalized
    to get off of smoking.
        Q. Now you do know that people use other pharmaceutical aids to quit
    smoking; don't you?
        A. Yeah. Patches and nicotine gum.
        Q. Inhalers?
        A. I'm not sure. I guess there are inhalers. I'm not --
        Q. Now you know that people suffer psycological withdrawal symptoms
    when they try to quit smoking?
        A. What do you mean by "psychological?"
        Q. Do they become irritable?
        A. Some people do. They become irritable if they give up coffee and
    caffeine, too.
        Q. Sir, I didn't ask you that.
        How many people a year does coffee kill?
        A. I don't know.
        Q. Has it ever been reported that coffee kills 420,000 people a year?
        A. Not to my knowledge.
        Q. Have you ever seen any reports like that?
        A. No.
        Q. Have you ever seen a report from the Surgeon General saying that
    coffee is the number one preventable health disease in this country?
        *5 A. No.
        Q. You don't know what the definitions of addiction are; do you, sir?
        MR. WEBER: Objection, Your Honor, it's asked and answered. We just went
    through that a few minutes ago.
        A. I gave --
        THE COURT: You may answer.
        Q. Let me ask it this way, sir: You don't know the medical definition
    is of addiction; do you?
        A. No.
        Q. Now at any time between 1954 and 19 -- and today, has RJR warned
    smokers that smoking is addictive?
        A. No.
        Q. At any time between 1954 and today, has RJR directed people to their
    internal memoranda which shows what RJR knew about nicotine and its
    addictive characteristics?
        A. Could you --
        Could you repeat that question?
        Q. Sure.
        At any time between 1954 and today, has RJR directed the public to
    RJR's internal documents to show what RJR knew about the addictive nature
    of nicotine?
        A. I don't recall the company directing the public to internal
    documents of the company.
        Q. Now you said that Joe Camel advertising stopped; is that right?
        A. Yes. July of last year.
        Q. July of 1997.
        A. Yes, sir.
        Q. So all advertising stopped on that day.
        A. Well it --
        That's when we started to make the transition, started to take down
    billboards, stop print ads, and made the transition to the new ad campaign,
    yes.
        Q. So you didn't --
        There wasn't anything new after that day is what I meant -- I'm asking.
    Is that right?
        A. What do you mean by "anything new?"
        Q. Well there wasn't any new advertising and promotions for Joe Camel
    after that date.
        A. All the billboards went down over a period of time, all the print
    ads, point of sales started to come down, and the only thing that's going
    on is we had a Camel Cash catalog for this year, which is a retrospective
    on all the ad campaigns that the brands had over its 85-year history, and
    there's three or four or five pages in that catalog that have Joe Camel
    memorabilia in that catalog, and that will finish in September of this
    year. That's the only thing that's going on.
        Q. That came out after RJR pledged not to have any more Joe Camel
    advertising; didn't it?
        A. When we withdrew the campaign from the market -- from the market or
    announced that we were doing it, we made it very clear that there would be
    a Camel Cash catalog. In fact, in the -- I believe we made that known to
    the attorneys in the Mangini case which we settled in California.
        So there was no hidden agenda there; that was very open, that we would
    have this retrospective Camel Cash catalog of which there were a few pages
    in there of Joe Camel memorabilia. But all the billboards, all the print
    advertising, point of sales I guess, virtually gone. There could still be a
    few pieces laying around out there, but Joe's off the broad public
    landscape.
        There's a few pages in the Camel Cash catalog which will end in
    September, and that will be it.
        Q. Mr. Goldstone didn't know that was still going on when he testified
    in front of Congress on January 29th; did he?
        *6 A. No. And it doesn't surprise me that he didn't; he doesn't review
    all the advertising, promotion and marketing plans that we have.
        Q. And in fact, he said it shouldn't be going on; didn't he?
        A. I don't remember that, that it shouldn't.
        Q. Well why don't you direct your attention to page 78 of the memo --
    or the transcript you have in front of you, Exhibit 24299.
        A. What page?
        Q. Page 78, sir.
        A. Yes.
        Q. Start at the top of that page. Representative Brown.
        A. Yes.
        Q. "Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to follow" --
        MR. WEBER: Can I object -- can I object to the reading of this
    question? It's a political speech from a political forum. It doesn't --
    under 403, it doesn't belong in a courtroom.
        MR. CIRESI: This is the testimony under oath, Your Honor, by Mr.
    Goldstone in response to a question by a member of Congress regarding the
    representations that all Camel advertising and promotion was done.
        MR. WEBER: I have no objection, Your Honor, to the Goldstone part, it's
    the political speechifying.
        THE COURT: That's something you can argue. But I don't see how we
    cannot have the question and just get the answer. So just -- I mean you may
    argue with his form of questioning, but you can certainly --
        MR. WEBER: Can I make one suggestion on that, Your Honor?
        THE COURT: Yes.
        MR. WEBER: Because he could ask just the question right before Mr.
    Goldstone speaks that begins "And I guess...," because that's the question
    after all the speechifying before it.
        THE COURT: Well --
        MR. CIRESI: Well I don't know what "speechifying" is, --
        THE COURT: Okay.
        MR. CIRESI: -- but it's the prelude to asking the question, Your Honor.
        THE COURT: I will allow a full question before an answer, and allow you
    --
        I mean if you want to argue to the jury later that this representative
    is a politician, you're welcome to do that.
    BY MR. CIRESI:
        Q. "REPRESENTATIVE BROWN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to follow up
    with Mr. Goldstone. I didn't get a chance earlier when we were trying to
    talk and the time ran out. I appreciate your comments that the documents
    were 'immoral, unethical, illegal"' --
        Do you see that, sir?
        A. Yes.
        Q. Those were the documents we have been viewing here in this courtroom
    that you've testified to; correct, sir?
        A. Yes.
        Q. Those were the documents to the board of directors; correct?
        A. Yes.
        Q. -- "I think, is the three adjectives you used. I'm troubled by some
    things with sort of the re-emergence on the Joe Camel stuff. Your company
    sent out a direct-mail piece to at least one family in Minnesota called
    "Camel Cash Timeless Collectibles, 1913 to 1998."
        "My understanding is you have retired Joe Camel. He's' gone; he's not
    coming back....you can send away still, even after Joe Camel went into
    retirement, you can get a set of tumblers called 'Joe's Beach Club.' You
    can get Camel T-shirts. You can get Joe Camel jamming on the piano, Joe
    Camel lighters. And my favorite is you can get a book of the illustrated
    history of Joe Camel stating, quote, 'Joe may be gone, but he won't be
    forgotten.'
        *7 That's troubling when you said publicly you're retiring Joe Camel.
    At the same time, something really more troubling than that happened in
    Cleveland, not far from my district, in restaurants and coffee clubs and
    concert halls all over, where there's something called Camel Clubs that was
    reported by a Cleveland newspaper when young sort of hip kids in their 20s
    -- of smoking age, of legal age -- go and sort buddy up with people that
    may or may not be 18 -- of legal age -- go and buddy up with people that
    may or may not be 18; may be 16 in some cases -- they're not places that --
    that go -- that only 18- or 21- year-olds are allow to go -- and give away
    cigarettes and get to know the people that work at the restaurants or the
    bars or the concert halls. These are the kinds of things still going on.
        "And I guess I'd like to ask you, in light of your comments of saying
    that the documents were immoral, unethical and illegal, are these things --
    is your company going to keep doing the Camel Clubs and keep doing the
    sales of Joe Camel paraphernalia?
        "MR. GOLDSTONE: Congressman, I feel quite strongly when I came to a
    conclusion a number of months ago that our company, for a lot of reasons,
    should not be using Joe Camel. And I do not expect our company to be using
    Joe Camel on -- I'm not sure what this is; I'm just looking at it now. But
    if this exists today, it is not going to exist -- I don't know that I can
    say tomorrow it will all be gone, but it should be gone. We are not going
    to use Joe Camel. And the only thing I can tell you about the other
    activity -- I mean, I do have to say to you that marketing or selling
    cigarettes in bars or in places where clearly you must be 21 years or older
    to get in has to be something that we can feel is a reasonable activity if
    tobacco companies are going to be able to advertise at all, because we know
    that children are not in those areas."
        Do you see that, sir?
        A. Yeah.
        Q. And Mr. Goldstone was not aware of the Joe Camel Cash Collectibles;
    correct?
        A. Apparently. Or if he was, he forgot. But he makes a statement it
    will be gone, and it will be gone. It -- it -- there's nothing -- there's
    no hidden agenda here. It's very open. It's a Cash -- Camel Cash catalog.
    Doesn't have Joe Camel on the cover; it has an ad or something, I believe,
    from back in the '30s or '40s.
        Believe it or not, Mr. Ciresi, adult smokers like Joe Camel, like the
    memorabilia. When we pulled the campaign, all of a sudden some of these old
    mugs and old ads and stuff started being collectibles and people really
    liked them. So we're doing a retrospective on 75 years of the brand. We
    have a few pages in there on Joe, and in September that's it, it's gone.
    And --
        Q. "Gone but -- Gone but not forgotten" is what you said in the Cash
    Collectibles brochure; correct?
        A. Well it won't be forgotten, but it will be gone.
        Q. And -- and you had devices in there that could be put around beer
    cans with Joe Camel; correct?
        *8 A. Yeah. Some of the stuff that was used over the about eight or
    nine years that we had the campaign.
        Q. T-shirts?
        A. Yeah.
        Q. Handlebar T-shirts, pool-player T-shirts; correct?
        A. Yeah, I believe so. I don't remember all the items in there.
        Q. Dart games; correct?
        A. Could be.
        Q. A beach club tumbler set; correct?
        A. Yes.
        Q. Money clips; correct?
        A. I don't have the catalog in front of me; I'll have to take your word
    for it, that you're getting it all out of the catalog.
        Q. Well let me hand you a copy of it, see if it will refresh your
    recollection.
        MR. CIRESI: May I approach, Your Honor?
            (Catalog handed to the witness.)
    BY MR. CIRESI:
        Q. That's the catalog; correct?
        A. Right.
        Q. And if you turn to the page dealing with Joe Camel, it says "The Joe
    Years;" correct?
        A. Yes.
        Q. All right.
        A. Yeah. "Joe Years."
        Q. And you've got a lot of posters there, the illustrated history of
    Joe; is that right?
        A. Yeah.
        Q. And then if you go over to the next page, you'll see the lighters,
    dart games; correct?
        A. Absolutely.
        Q. And you go to the next page --
        That's this page here (displaying); correct, sir?
        A. Yes.
        Q. Then you go to the next page and you've got ashtrays; correct?
        MR. WEBER: Your Honor, I'd object at this point.
        A. Yes.
        MR. WEBER: If he's using this for refreshment of recollection --
        THE COURT: Just a moment, please. Would you allow me to rule, please?
        A. Yeah, ashtrays or --
        THE COURT: Sir, sir.
        THE WITNESS: Oh.
        THE COURT: Would you allow me to rule on the objection, please? Okay.
    Thank you.
        The objection is sustained unless you're going to introduce it as an
    exhibit.
        MR. CIRESI: All right. Thank you, Your Honor.
    BY MR. CIRESI:
        Q. And there were T-shirts in there; correct, sir?
        A. Yes.
        Q. And people will be able to order from this until September of this
    year; correct?
        A. Yes.
        Q. And this went into effect in February of this year; correct?
        A. I believe that's right, yes.
        Q. About nine months after RJR said that it wasn't going to use the Joe
    Camel image any more; correct, sir?
        A. Yes. And when we said we were pulling out of the Joe campaign, we
    told people we had this Camel Cash catalog coming out in this retrospective
    fashion, which also has a bunch of other items from the '40s and the '50s
    in it, too.
        Q. Apparently you didn't tell Mr. Goldstone, the CEO, or he forgot when
    he testified under --
        A. He might have.
        Q. Excuse me.
        A. He's a busy man.
        Q. Excuse me.
        Apparently you didn't tell Mr. Goldstone, your CEO, or he forgot when
    he testified under oath; is that right?
        A. He may have forgotten. He may -- he may not have known. I just can't
    remember.
        Q. Now you'll recall that yesterday we went over the Frank Statement?
        A. Yes.
        Q. The representations that were made by RJR, among others of the
    defendants, to the public back in 1954; correct?
        *9 A. Yes.
        Q. Now you testified that RJR is part of The Tobacco Institute;
    correct?
        A. Yes.
        Q. It has also supported The Council for Tobacco Research since 1954;
    hasn't it?
        A. Yes.
        Q. And that was previously known as the TIRC; correct?
        A. I believe so, yes.
        Q. And you know that was formed in 1954 to engage, among -- in, among
    other things, public relations; correct?
        A. It was formed in 1954, from my understanding, to do research into
    diseases related to smoking.
        Q. Okay. Can you direct your attention, sir, to Exhibit 18904.
        A. I'm there.
        Q. This is a Hill & Knowlton document, sir, that's already been
    introduced into evidence. Have you seen this before?
        A. Hmm. This is one I don't think I've seen.
        Q. Okay. Then let's back up a document and let's go to 18905 first.
        A. Yes.
        Q. This is another Hill & Knowlton document dated December 15th, 1953.
    Have you seen this?
        A. I don't think so.
        Q. You are aware, based on your knowledge of the history of the tobacco
    industry, that in 1953 certain studies were published in Reader's Digest
    and other places concerning smoking and lung cancer?
        A. You know, I remember that broadly as part of the historical past of
    45 years ago.
        Q. And at that time that caused great alarm among the tobacco industry?
        A. I was nine years old at the time. I wasn't around for the great
    alarm in the tobacco industry in 1953 or '4.
        Q. Well have you learned about that during the course of your career
    with RJR?
        A. No. I don't remember interacting with anybody in or -- in the course
    of my career who was telling me about the great alarm they had in 1953 over
    the Reader's Digest articles.
        Q. Have you learned about the steps the industry took in order to get
    out information that was entirely pro cigarette?
        A. In 1950s?
        Q. Yes.
        A. I -- I wasn't in the company in the '50s.
        Q. That's not what I asked.
        A. I -- you know, there --
        If we're referring to specific documents, I think we should just go to
    them. I don't read --
        I mean I haven't studied 1953 and '54.
        Q. Well then is your answer no?
        A. I suppose it is.
        Q. Well then just say no, sir.
        MR. WEBER: Object to the commentary of counsel, --
        A. No.
        MR. WEBER: -- Your Honor.
        Q. Thank you.
        Have you read Exhibit 18905?
        A. No, I haven't.
        Q. Can you go to the first page.
        MR. WEBER: Your Honor, I'd object to any questioning on this exhibit
    under Rule 602, which limits testimony to matters of which the witness has
    knowledge. And in addition, it's cumulative, it's a document that's been
    gone through before with other witnesses.
        THE COURT: Not with this witness though.
        MR. WEBER: And then on Rule 602, Your Honor?
        THE COURT: Denied.
    BY MR. CIRESI:
        Q. Do you see, sir, in the first page, that one of the participants in
    this meeting at the Hotel Plaza was a group called together by Paul Hahan,
    president of American Tobacco, and one of the chief executive officers was
    from R. J. Reynolds?
        *10 A. Yes.
        Q. Have you seen this document now before?
        A. No, I haven't.
        Q. Okay. You didn't get an opportunity to read this in preparation for
    your testimony?
        A. I just told you I've never seen it.
        Q. Okay. Can you direct your attention to the next page, and about four
    paragraphs down under Roman numeral III, "The Industry's Position," do you
    see the statement, "They feel they should sponsor a public relations
    campaign which is positive in nature and is entirely 'pro-cigarettes.' They
    are confident they can supply us with comprehensive and authoritative
    scientific material which completely refutes the health charges?"
        A. Yes, I see that.
        Q. And were you aware that the TIRC, the forerunner of the CTR, was
    formed in part to carry on public relations functions?
        A. No, I'm not aware of that. My experience with CTR is we give money
    to the CTR, and blue ribbon panel of medical research and scientists
    administer grants throughout the country, Nobel Prize winners and American
    Academy of Science people that -- that administer that money.
        Q. Have you ever --
        A. I have no knowledge of this PR thing back in the '50s.
        Q. Okay.
        A. From what I've seen -- the purpose, as I understand it, is what I've
    seen carried out, in my experience with it.
        Q. And sir, have you ever called these Nobel Prize winners and
    academicians together to have a blue ribbon committee to determine from
    them whether they believe smoking causes lung cancer?
        A. No, I've never done that.
        Q. Have you ever called them together to see if smoking causes chronic
    obstructive pulmonary disease?
        A. No, I haven't.
        Q. Have you ever called them together to see if smoking causes chronic
    heart disease?
        A. No, I haven't.
        Q. Have you called them together to see if smoking causes any disease?
        A. No, I haven't.
        Q. Now you do know that back in 1953 and early 1954, the companies
    considered that their own advertising and competitive practices had caused
    a health problem. You know that; don't you?
        A. Could you repeat the question, please?
        Q. Sure.
        You do know that back in 1953 and early 1954, the companies considered
    that their own advertising and competitive practices created a health
    problem.
        A. No, I don't know that. I've never heard that before.
        Q. Nobody ever told you that?
        A. No. You're the first one.
        Q. Well, can you direct your attention to page three.
        A. Yes.
        Q. And if you look at the second indented paragraph.
        A. "Distribution" --
        Q. "Do the companies...." Do you see that?
        I'm sorry, the further indented paragraph, I should have said.
        A. Oh, "Do the companies...," is that what you're --
        Q. Yes.
        A. Okay.
        Q. "Do the companies consider that their own advertising and
    competitive practices have been a principal factor in creating a health
    problem?
        "The companies voluntarily admitted this to be the case even before the
    question was asked."
        Do you see that?
        *11 A. Yeah, I see that.
        Q. And where in the Frank Statement is the statement that the company's
    advertising and competitive practices have been a principal factor in
    creating a health problem?
        A. Can you repeat the question, please?
        Q. I will, indeed.
        Sir, I'll give you an opportunity if you want to read another paragraph
    in there.
        A. Well I --
        Q. If you could -- if you could listen --
        A. -- I've never seen this before, and you give me a couple of
    sentences and then start asking questions. I'll have to admit while you
    were asking the question I was trying to read a little bit of this thing.
        Q. And I'll give you an opportunity to do that if you want to;
    otherwise, if you'd listen to my question, we'll be able to move through it
    a little quicker. All right? Is that agreeable?
        A. Fine. Go ahead.
        Q. Where in the Frank Statement did RJR or any of the tobacco companies
    say that their advertising and competitive practices have been a principal
    factor in creating a health problem?
        A. Nowhere that I know of.
        Q. In fact, they said that their products did not create a health
    problem; didn't they?
        A. I believe they said that they didn't believe that products were
    injurious to health or something like that.
        Q. So they said directly contrary to what they said internally;
    correct?
        A. I don't know what they were talking about here. I don't know if they
    were talking about an actual health problem or the problem of the health
    community attacking them because of the nature of their ads, so I don't
    really know what they were talking about here in 1953 when I was probably
    in eighth or ninth grade. I had -- you know, you --
        You're interpreting this as they were admitting that cigarettes and
    advertising caused health problems. They could be talking about the problem
    they had with the health community because of the nature of their
    advertising. I don't know.
        Q. Are you done?
        A. Yes.
        Q. Okay. But what the document says is that "Do the companies consider
    that their own advertising and competitive practices have been a principal
    factor in creating a health problem?
        "The companies voluntarily admitted this to be the is case even before
    the question was asked."
        That's what the document says; correct?
        A. I understand that, Mr. Ciresi. This is the first time I have seen
    this document. This is 45 years ago. I have no idea what happened in this
    meeting. I don't even know who these people were that were in the meeting.
    And you're asking me to tell you what I think about these two or three
    sentences in this document. I have no knowledge of what these folks were
    doing.
        Q. Now can you go to Exhibit 18904.
        A. I'm there.
        Q. Do you know if the companies were faced at that time with a problem
    of establishing confidence in the companies and the companies' leaders?
        MR. WEBER: Your Honor, I have the same objections under 602 and
    cumulative as with the last one.
        THE COURT: It's denied.
        *12 A. I have no knowledge.
        Q. All right. Can you direct your attention, please, sir, first of all,
    to the second page of this document.
        Do you know if the companies at this time wanted a cancer- free
    cigarette?
        A. I have no idea.
        Q. Do you know if Hill & Knowlton interviewed the research directors of
    the companies?
        A. I have no idea.
        Q. All right. Do you see it reported on page two.
        A. Where?
        Q. At the top of the page, "The attitude of the men we must directly
    deal with in the industry is at once interesting, and important for us to
    understand. This is why notes on the four interviews with 'research
    directors' are given at some length. You'll get from them little real
    information about lung cancer, pro or con; but you'll find some mighty
    interesting opinions. One of them said, 'It's fortunate for us that
    cigarettes are a habit they can't break."' Do you see that?
        A. Yes. Whoever said that was wrong. Forty some million people seem to
    have broken the habit, the volume in the industry has declined 20 some
    percent since 1982, so obviously this person's forecasting skills were a
    little limited.
        Q. Well how many people have died from smoking-related diseases --
        A. I have no --
        Q. -- since 19 --
        Excuse me, sir.
        A. I have no idea.
        Q. Excuse me. How many people have died from smoking-related diseases
    since 1987?
        A. I have no idea.
        Q. I suppose they aren't buying cigarettes any more; are they? Are
    they, sir?
        A. I don't believe people who are not alive can buy cigarettes.
        Q. So that volume would go down; wouldn't it, sir?
        A. Yes, sir.
        Q. And if schools in states were trying to overcome the advertising of
    your companies to prevent youth from smoking and youth didn't smoke, that
    would cause the volume to go down; wouldn't it?
        A. I don't believe our advertising causes youth to smoke.
        Q. Well, if the schools in the states were trying to overcome the
    tendency of people to smoke, young people, for whatever reason, that would
    cause the volume of smoking to go down; wouldn't it?
        A. If people stopped smoking, the volume will go down.
        Q. And your volume went up.
        A. When?
        Q. In the last two years. Hasn't it?
        A. Our volume?
        Q. Yes.
        A. Our cigarette volume?
        Q. Yes.
        A. No. Our cigarette volume -- I don't know what -- from, say, 1992 to
    today, has probably gone down maybe 20 percent.
        Q. The last two years, sir, the volume --
        A. It's gone down in the last two years, probably about five -- four,
    five percent.
        Q. Has your market share gone up?
        A. No.
        Q. Did it go up last year?
        A. Our total market share? No.
        Q. No, did the market share in any brand go up?
        A. Oh, yeah. Camel share went up with four to five tenths of a share
    point.
        Q. And did it go up from the time the Joe Camel ad came on?
        A. Yes.
        Q. Every year it went up?
        A. Not every year.
        Q. Almost every year; correct?
        A. Probably most of the years, but not every year.
        *13 Q. And it went up in the youngest category; didn't it, sir?
    Youngest age group?
        A. Eighteen to 24?
        Q. Let's take your definition, 18 to 24. Went up every year; didn't it?
        A. No, I don't think it's gone up every year.
        Q. Can you think of one year that it didn't since 1988?
        A. Yeah. I believe it actually went down some from ninety through --
    '93 through '96.
        Q. The Camel --
        A. '93, '94 --
        Q. Camel --
        A. Talking about 18 to 24.
        Q. Camel --
        A. Yeah, there's some -- there's been some decline in the 18 to 24.
    After the campaign started, somewhere within a couple years or so, and I'm
    not sure of the exact dates, it went up to 10 to 13 percent of 18 to 24.
    It's been at nine, it's been at 10, it's been at 13; it's bounced around a
    bit.
        Q. So --
        A. It's not been -- it's not been some steady rise in 18 to 24.
        Q. It's gone up multiples since before that campaign was put into
    place; hasn't it?
        A. I told you it went up from before the campaign, but it has not
    continued to rise, as you implied in your question.
        Q. Now if you go back to this document, "'It's fortunate for us that
    cigarettes are a habit they can't break."' You can't break --
        A. What --
        Q. Excuse me, sir. I haven't finished.
        A. No, I'm not sure where you are.
        Q. On page two, the same document.
        A. Okay.
        Q. Right where we were.
        A. You're more familiar with this document than I am, so you have to
    give me a few minutes to find the place.
        Q. Did your lawyers give you this document? It was a designated
    document.
        A. I had told you when we started here I do not remember seeing this
    document, and as we've gotten into it I can tell you I haven't seen this
    document.
        Q. "'It's fortunate for us that cigarettes are a habit they can't
    break."' If somebody can't break a habit, are they addicted to it?
        A. I don't agree with that statement.
        Q. Didn't ask you that.
        A. Well if somebody can't break a habit -- can't, impossible -- I guess
    you'd say they were addicted to it.
        Q. All right. Now is everybody who uses cocaine unable to stop using
    cocaine?
        A. No.
        Q. Is everybody who uses heroin unable to stop using heroin?
        MR. WEBER: Objection, Your Honor, asked and answered earlier this
    morning.
        A. No.
        MR. WEBER: We went through this.
        THE COURT: Well this is a little different question.
        Q. Your answer was no; is that right?
        A. Yes, it was no.
        Q. Do you see the next statement, "'Boy! wouldn't it be wonderful if
    our company was the first to produce a cancer free cigarette."'
        A. Yes.
        Q. "'What we could do to the competition!"' Do you see that?
        A. Yes.
        Q. Did RJR at any time from 1954 forward say that they knew back in
    1954 that their cigarettes cause cancer?
        A. Could you ask me the question again?
        Q. Yes. At any time since 1954, has RJR said that their cigarettes
    cause cancer?
        A. No.
        Q. Can you go down to the next paragraph. "At the moment, these men
    feel thrown for a loop. They've competed for years - not in price, not in
    any real difference of quality - but just in ability to conjure up more
    hypnotic claims and brighter assurances for what their own brand might do
    for a smoker, compared to another brand." Do you see that?
        *14 A. Yes.
        Q. Now sir, over the years RJR has sold low tar/low nicotine
    cigarettes; correct?
        A. Yes. Low tar cigarettes have been on the market since, ah, late
    '60s, early '70s.
        Q. And you don't know if those cigarettes are safer because you have no
    data to confirm that they are safer; correct?
        A. That's true.
        Q. That's absolutely true; isn't it?
        A. That I have no data that says low tar cigarettes are safer?
        Q. Yes.
        A. That's true. I have no data that -- that I know of that says low tar
    cigarettes are safer.
        Q. RJR has no data; correct?
        A. That's right. I don't know of any data RJR has that says low tar
    cigarettes are safer.
        Q. You're not aware of any such data that the industry has; correct?
        A. I'm not aware of any.
        Q. Are you aware that in this courtroom, RJR is suggesting that low tar
    cigarettes are safer? Are you aware of that?
        A. No.
        Q. If they were, if they're trying to convince the ladies and gentlemen
    of this jury that they are, there's no data to support that; is there, sir?
        A. I --
        MR. WEBER: Objection, Your Honor, --
        A. I don't --
        MR. WEBER: -- it's a misstatement of what's been said in this case.
        THE COURT: I think you'll have to rephrase that question, counsel.
        Q. I want you to assume that that is what's being urged in this
    courtroom. If that is being urged, you know of no data to confirm that; do
    you, sir?
        MR. WEBER: Same objection, Your Honor.
        THE COURT: You may answer that.
        A. I'm not going to assume that was said in this courtroom. I find it
    hard to believe that it was. In fact I don't believe it was.
        Q. Because --
        A. So why shall I assume something that I believe didn't happen?
        Q. Well let me --
        I'm going to ask you two questions on that. Number one, I have a right
    to ask you to assume. So we'll go forward and say: Assuming that, you know
    of no data to confirm it; correct?
        A. I don't --
        MR. WEBER: I object to counsel's commentary in the preface to the
    question, Your Honor.
        THE COURT: No, I think it was necessary to ask.
        Q. You know of no data to confirm it; do you?
        A. I don't know of any Reynolds data that says that low tar cigarettes
    are safer, and I do not assume that that happened in this courtroom.
        Q. In fact, you would find that hard to believe because you don't
    believe it; correct?
        A. Believe what?
        Q. That low tar/nicotine cigarettes are safer.
        A. In the absolute sense that you're defining that, I believe that, you
    know, basically what medical science has said over the years, that it's a
    good idea to address the risk in smoking -- cigarette smoke by reducing the
    tar levels. And we've pursued that over the years; we have cigarettes today
    that are substantially less in tar and nicotine. I believe in principle
    they may have or have the potential to reduce the risk. They certainly
    reduce the compounds that science associates with the risk of smoking. In
    the absolute sense of a safer cigarette, I couldn't say that. But it
    reduces tar, reduces compounds that people associate with the risk of
    smoking.
        *15 Q. Are you done?
        A. Yeah.
        Q. Okay. Let me ask my question again. See if you can answer it.
        You stated --
        MR. WEBER: Object to counsel's commentary again, Your Honor.
        THE COURT: No, that's not commentary.
        Q. You stated as follows: "I'm not going to assume that was said in
    this courtroom. I find it hard to believe it was. In fact I don't believe
    it was." Isn't that what you said?
        A. Yeah.
        Q. Thank you, sir.
        Now in 1954, were you aware that the problem that was facing the
    industry was confidence and how to establish it, public assurance and how
    to create it?
        A. I was not aware of that in 1954.
        Q. Did anybody advise you that that was how the industry looked at the
    health issue at that time before they formed The Council for Tobacco
    Research, then known as the TIRC?
        A. I was in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania in grade school in 1954.
        Q. That's not what I asked you, sir.
        A. I -- I do not know what you're talking about here in terms of 45 or
    44 years ago and conversations between PR firms and executives and
    scientists in 1954. I have no knowledge of what they were doing.
        Q. Please direct your attention to page four of this exhibit.
        A. Yes.
        Q. Very top. "Problem 1.
        "The very first problem is to establish some public confidence in the
    industry's leaders themselves, so that the public will believe their
    assertions of their own interest in the public health." Do you see that?
        A. Yes.
        Q. And by "their assurances" -- excuse me.
        By "their assertions," that's referring to the industry's leaders'
    assertions; correct?
        A. Appears that way. I think it does.
        Q. And you're an industry leader today; correct?
        A. Yes.
        Q. And you're making statements of your interest in the public health;
    aren't you?
        A. What do you mean?
        Q. That you are interested in not selling to children; correct?
        A. We don't sell to children. We don't market or develop marketing
    programs for children.
        Q. And so you're making a statement about the public health and you
    want people to believe it; correct?
        A. That's the way we operate the company. It's a fact.
        Q. Can you answer my question?
        A. Well of course I want people to believe it --
        Q. All right.
        A. -- because it's the truth.
        Q. Now let's go on to see what the industry thought of their statements
    in the past. Do you know if they felt that they tended to twist the facts?
        A. I don't know if people tended to twist the facts in the past.
        Q. Can you go to page five. Do you see problem three?
        A. Yes.
        Q. "How to validate this message of assurance." Do you see that?
        A. Yes.
        Q. And then it says, "The men talked to in the cigarette companies tend
    to," and then it goes through subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c), do you see
    that?
        A. Yes.
        Q. One of the things they tended to was to smear the personal
    responsibility, motives, judgments or techniques of Wynder and others
    supporting him. Do you see that?
        *16 MR. WEBER: Your Honor, I'd object to any questions about the
    characterizations by Hill & Knowlton about what other people did. I think
    that's inappropriate under 403.
        THE COURT: No, I think it's appropriate. These people are working for
    the tobacco company and they're talking about the tobacco executives. It's
    relevant, and I will allow that inquiry.
        Q. Do you see that, sir?
        A. Paragraph (a)?
        Q. Yes.
        A. Okay. What's --
        Yeah, I see the --
        Q. Okay.
        A. -- the sentence.
        Q. "The men talked to in the tobacco" -- or "in the cigarette companies
    tend to:
        "Think occasionally in terms of trying to 'smear' the personal
    responsibility, motives, judgments, or techniques of Wynder and others...."
    Do you see that?
        A. That's what this says.
        Q. Okay. And Wynder was one of the scientists who published materials
    regarding the relationship of smoking to lung cancer; correct?
        A. Yes.
        Q. You remember his name; don't you?
        A. Well I've heard his name over the years, yes.
        Q. Now another thing that the men talked to in the cigarette companies
    tend to do is set forth in paragraph (c). Do you see that?
        A. Yes.
        Q. "To overlook the fact that in this particular instance, the stakes
    for the public are even larger than for the tobacco manufacturers. (For the
    public, an issue touching the deepest of human fears and instincts is
    involved - the issues of uncontrollable disease and death. Hence cigarette
    companies might not readily be forgiven, if their approach to this problem
    is stemmed only from eagerness to protect their earnings, and if they
    twisted the research of medical science (which seeks to save men) into a
    device to save stockholders. There is no precedent where a great industry
    has been forced to face such grave issues."
        "In the past, industry has given little twists to the facts of science,
    to convert them into sales propoganda, without much risk. The cigarette
    industry has indeed been doing this for years."
        Now did you know that, sir?
        A. Did I know that somebody wrote this in this document 40 some years
    ago? No.
        Q. No. Did you know that an agent of the tobacco industry who met with
    the executives and research directors wrote that in the past, industry had
    given little twists to the facts of science to convert them into sales
    propoganda without much risk? Did you know that?
        A. I did not know that anybody ever wrote this or said that, or this
    person existed or anything.
        Q. Nobody ever told you about this.
        A. No.
        Q. Nobody ever told you that it was these documents which led to the
    Frank Statement put out by your company and the other manufacturers who are
    sitting around these tables represented by these lawyers. Nobody ever told
    you that.
        A. No.
        Q. "We can therefore" -- if you go back to the page where I was. "We
    can therefore readily" --
        A. Wait, wait, wait a minute. Where -- I'm lost.
        Q. Same paragraph.
        A. Oh. Okay. Got you.
        Q. "We can therefore readily understand its assumptions that the same
    technique will work now, in devising propaganda. But it is highly important
    to note that the deep issues of life-and-death that are involved make
    highly doubtful the question as to whether the familiar techniques can be
    relied on. The stakes are too large; the penalties for losing could be too
    great."
        *17 Do you see that?
        A. Yes, I see that.
        Q. Did anybody ever advise you of that?
        A. No.
        Q. If the tobacco industry has twisted the facts over the years, the
    penalties should be great; shouldn't they?
        A. I'm not a lawyer or a judge, I don't know how to answer a legal
    question that you seem to be putting to me.
        Q. I'm not asking you a legal question, I'm just asking you as one
    human being to another. If this industry twisted the facts over the years
    regarding science, the penalties should be great; shouldn't they?
        MR. WEBER: Your Honor, I'd object to the commentary, to the
    argumentative nature, and to the fact that it does deal with legal issues
    for the jury.
        THE COURT: No, it's a proper question, except for the first half of the
    statement.
        MR. CIRESI: I'll withdraw that part of it.
        THE COURT: The question itself is okay.
    BY MR. CIRESI:
        Q. Sir, if the tobacco industry twisted the facts over the years, the
    penalties should be great; correct?
        A. I don't --
        That's a legal judgment I believe you're asking me to make. I'm
    incapable of making that. I don't -- I mean I don't know how to answer that
    question.
        Q. Just no way of knowing; right?
        A. I'm not a lawyer. I'm not a judge.
        Q. So you think --
        A. If there are legal penalties to be rendered, they'll be rendered by
    the jury.
        Q. So that's for the jury --
        A. They will sit and judge what they see and they will render their
    decision. That's the way the system works.
        Q. And you have no idea whether the penalties should be great if the
    facts were twisted by the industry that you worked for for over 40 years.
        MR. WEBER: Objection, Your Honor, asked and answered. It's the last
    question.
        THE COURT: It's been asked and answered.
        Q. Now sir, if you look back on page five of that document, --
        A. Yes.
        Q. -- you see that at the top there's a reference to a smoker starting
    with "He might just as well go on enjoying his smoke...." Do you see that?
        A. Yes.
        Q. "He might just as well go on enjoying his smoke in this interim
    while research pursues the facts, with full assurance that if any
    cancer-causing agent is ever found -- really found in tobacco, the
    manufacturers will quickly find a way to eliminate it." Do you see that?
        A. Yes.
        Q. And if you go on over to the bottom of page seven, at the bottom of
    that page, --
        A. Yes.
        Q. -- last paragraph, "You can count on the cigarette companies (who
    have obligated themselves to pour millions of dollars into cancer research)
    to take anything out of your cigarette that is a health hazard" --
        Does that mean if it's a risk?
        A. I guess we're talking about risk, yes.
        Q. Okay.
        -- "if our science ever really finds any such hazard in the wonderful
    tobacco leaf. Meanwhile know this: despite the most elaborate attempts, no
    efforts to give mice a lung illness by making them live days on end in
    tobacco smoke has ever produced a cause -- case of such illness through
    that kind of exposure." Do you see that?
        *18 A. Yes.
        Q. Okay. That's animal testing; correct?
        A. Yes.
        Q. Biological testing; correct?
        A. Yes.
        Q. And did RJR do biological testing?
        A. In the '50s?
        Q. In the '60s, in the '50s --
        Let's start in the '50s.
        A. I don't know.
        Q. Did they do it in the '60s?
        A. I'm not sure. I think so, but I'm not sure.
        Q. Did they have a Mouse House that they closed down?
        A. I've heard that.
        Q. Did you read the documents about it?
        A. No.
        Q. Do you know if it was closed down because the CEOs of RJR and Philip
    Morris talked and that it was in violation of the gentlemen's agreement not
    to do that type of research?
        A. No, I don't know that.
        Q. You don't know.
        A. Never heard of a gentlemen's agreement.
        Q. Did RJR in the '50s and '60s know about cancer-causing compounds in
    the wonderful tobacco leaf?
        A. I believe in the '50s and '60s, obviously Reynolds, I would imagine
    the other companies, the public health community, science, was in the
    rather aggressive identification process of compounds in cigarettes, so I'm
    sure in the '50s and the '60s they knew there were compounds in cigarettes
    that had been identified that had the potential to be cancer-causing or
    potential to have health risk.
        Q. So RJR knew; correct, sir?
        A. I would think. There was a lot of work, in my understanding, going
    on back in those days, not just at Reynolds but throughout the scientific
    community, to attempt to identify various compounds in cigarettes.
        Q. Did you not understand the question I asked you?
        A. Apparently I didn't, because you're going to ask it again.
        Q. Well, you let me know if you don't understand the question that I
    ask you. Is that agreeable?
        A. Yeah.
        Q. Okay. Did Reynolds know that there were cance-causing compounds in
    cigarettes in the 1950s and '60s?
        A. I believe --
        MR. WEBER: Object, Your Honor, that was asked and answered. It was a
    proper answer.
        THE COURT: It was not answered.
        A. I believe, based on what I've heard, that Reynolds was doing
    research related to identifying compounds in cigarettes that could
    potentially be cancer-causing.
        Q. Okay. They were hazards found in the wonderful tobacco leaf;
    correct?
        A. Hazards?
        Q. Yes.
        A. They were compounds, as I understand all this, that had the
    potential. Whether or not they were literally hazards in that sense I don't
    know, but they were identifying compounds --
        Q. Well you just said no --
        A. -- and publishing on it.
        Q. Excuse me, sir. Didn't you just say earlier that if it was cancer-
    causing, it would be a hazard?
        A. I don't remember what you're referring to.
        Q. Can you direct your attention to Exhibit 12581.
        A. That's a different book; right?
        Q. It is.
        Can you tell me, sir, while you're looking for that document, when
    Reynolds warned the consuming public that it knew there were cancer-causing
    compounds in its cigarettes?
        THE COURT: Counsel, I don't think it's fair to the witness to have him
    looking through to find a document and then ask a question at the same
    time.
        *19 MR. CIRESI: I'm sorry.
        THE COURT: Why don't you wait until he finds the document, then address
    the question, please.
        A. I have --
        Q. Do you have the document?
        A. Yes, I have the document, yes.
        Q. Do you know when RJR warned the public that it knew there were
    cancer- causing compounds in its cigarettes?
        A. I don't know that R. J. Reynolds ever, as you put it, warned the
    public that there were cancer-causing compounds in cigarettes.
        Q. Never, right up to today; correct?
        A. I don't recall the company ever taking out an ad or -- if that's
    what you're referring to.
        Q. People would write in and ask for information to Reynolds; wouldn't
    they?
        A. I suppose so, yes.
        Q. People write in and complain about ads that Reynolds was running;
    correct?
        A. Are you talking about today?
        Q. Yeah. In the '80s, in the '70s.
        A. Yeah, people --
        You get people that write all sorts of things.
        Q. Okay. And people who wrote in and asked about the health hazards and
    what Reynolds knew about the health hazards of smoking, did Reynolds tell
    them what was in their files?
        A. No, not that I know of.
        Q. And those were members of the public; correct, that would write in?
        A. Yes.
        Q. The members who you made -- and by "you" I mean RJR --
    representations to in the Frank Statement; correct?
        A. Could be, yes. I mean people --
        That was in the public, people that write in are from the public.
        Q. And one of the representations, quoted correctly, "We believe the
    products we make are not injurious to health." Correct?
        A. Yes, that's what that says.
        Q. Now if you direct your attention, sir, to Exhibit 12581.
        A. Yes.
        Q. This is a "SURVEY OF CANCER RESEARCH with emphasis on POSSIBLE
    CARCINOGENS FROM TOBACCO" by Claude E. Teague, Jr., 2nd of February, 1953.
    Do you see that?
        A. Yes.
        Q. It's the same Mr. Teague we saw yesterday -- or Dr. Teague we saw
    yesterday; correct?
        A. Sure is, I think.
        Q. Have you seen this document before?
        A. Yes, I believe I have.
        Q. Okay. When's the first time you saw it?
        A. I can't remember. I started seeing documents, as I've said before,
    you know, starting about a year and a half ago as I started to become
    involved in various cases in litigation.
        Q. Can you direct your attention to page 14.
        A. Yes.
        Q. And you see --
        A. Or I'm sorry -- I'm sorry.
        Q. And I'm talking about the 14, not the Bates number, but the other
    number, sir.
        A. Yeah.
        Q. Do you have it?
        A. Yeah. "Tobacco Additives" and --
        Q. Correct. And do you see the "CONCLUSIONS" section there?
        A. Yes.
        Q. And Dr. Teague concludes there that "The increased incidence of
    cancer of the lung in man which has occurred during the last half century
    is probably due to new or increased contact with carcinogenic stimuli."
    Correct?
        A. That's what it says.
        Q. He goes on to state, "The closely parallel increase in cigarette
    smoking has led to the suspicion that tobacco smoking is an important
    etiologic factor in the induction of primary cancer of the lung." Do you
    see that?
        *20 A. Yes.
        Q. And do you know what the term "etiologic" means?
        A. No. You want to tell me?
        Q. Do you know if it means cause?
        A. Cause.
        Q. And he goes on to state, "Studies of clinical data tend to confirm
    the relationship between heavy and prolonged tobacco smoking and incidence
    of cancer of the lung;" correct?
        A. That's what it says.
        Q. Now this was almost a year before the Frank Statement; correct?
        A. Yeah.
        Q. And in the Frank Statement, RJR said that its product was not
    injurious to the health of its users; correct?
        A. Yeah. I believe what they said is they didn't believe that it was.
        Q. And of course cancer is injurious to people's health; isn't it?
        A. Sure is.
        Q. Kills people; correct?
        A. It can.
        Q. And Dr. Teague goes on to say, under "RECOMMENDATIONS"
        "It is recommended that this preliminary, broad survey of cancer
    research be supplemented by complete, detailed surveys of the individual
    topics discussed above." Correct?
        A. Yes. Uh-huh.
        Q. "Such surveys should be made at frequent and regular intervals in
    the future so as to make current developments properly available to
    interested persons." Correct?
        A. Yes.
        Q. And an interested person would be a user of the product; correct?
        A. I don't know who -- an interested person could be somebody who
    smokes or it could be something else he's referring to. Could be he's
    referring to people in the company. I don't know who he's referring to as
    "interested persons."
        Q. Certainly could be your customers; correct? And by "your," I mean
    RJR's customers.
        A. Yeah, could be. But it seems to me what he was doing here was doing
    a survey of available medical literature on this subject and summarizing
    it. It's not clear to me why the company would publish public medical
    literature on research into cancer to smokers.
        Q. Do you remember --
        A. It's already publicly available.
        Q. Have you ever done a survey of your smokers and say, "How many of
    you read the medical literature?"
        A. No.
        Q. Would it be fair to state, sir, that you would find very, very, very
    few consumers would be reading the medical literature?
        A. I think that's true.
        Q. And would it also be fair to state that the company has a duty to
    tell the public about what it knows about its product?
        MR. WEBER: Let me object on asked and answered. We went through that
    yesterday, Your Honor.
        THE COURT: It has been asked and answered.
        Q. Let me ask it another way. Having in mind your testimony that the
    company has such a duty, do you know if RJR ever put out at regular
    intervals any type of surveys of the medical literature so that its
    consumers would know in one place what RJR knew?
        MR. WEBER: Let me object to the beginning of that question because it
    attempts to summarize a bunch of testimony from yesterday. I mean the
    remainder is all right, Your Honor.
        THE COURT: No, I think the question is okay. You may answer that.
        *21 MR. CIRESI: You may answer.
        THE WITNESS: Could you please repeat --
        MR. CIRESI: Can we have the question back, please?
            (Record read by the court reporter.)
        A. No, I don't -- I don't believe the company has.
        Q. And if you go on to the next page, sir, Dr. Teague is stating that
    it's recommended that all tobacco additives, flavorants and humectants used
    by the company be examined carefully with respect to their possible roles
    as carcinogens or carcinogen- producing agents; correct?
        A. Yes.
        Q. Do you know if RJR ever did that?
        A. We have toxicologists internal to the company that review on a
    continuing basis all of the additives in -- in the product. That list has
    been provided to Health and Human Services, all the additives that are in
    the products, since the mid-'80s. There was a blue ribbon panel of
    toxicologists on an industry-wide basis that evaluates additives. You know,
    I think we do -- I know we do a lot of work relative to additives. In terms
    --
        Q. In the 1980s you said?
        A. Started --
        Well I know for sure it started in the -- in the early 1980s, that I'm
    sure of. I don't know what the company did relative to that prior to that
    because I have no experience relative to this issue prior to that. But in
    the early '80s I know we did. That's when I became a plant manager and
    became familiar with the methodologies and so forth that we were using in
    the company.
        Q. Did RJR provide that information to the public?
        A. Provide what information?
        Q. Its knowledge of carcinogens in the additives and flavorants and
    humectants.
        A. I don't know of any carcinogens that we have in flavors and
    additives and humectants and all that sort of stuff, and if there is any, I
    don't think we ever published that list to -- to the public. But we
    published a list of additives in 1994.
        Q. Nineteen --
        A. Ninety-four.
        Q. And what caused the publishing of those additives in 1994?
        A. A decision by the industry to publish them.
        Q. After the filing of this lawsuit; wasn't it?
        A. I don't know. When was it --
        I'm not sure when this lawsuit was filed. I don't think it had anything
    to do with this lawsuit.
        Q. Okay. Now you say you formed a blue ribbon panel; is that right?
        A. It is my understanding that there is an outside panel of
    toxicologists that evaluate additives that are used in cigarette products.
        Q. The entire industry got together with a blue ribbon panel of their
    own toxicologists; correct?
        A. No.
        Q. Isn't that what you said?
        A. Our own toxicologists? No. My -- my understanding is that there --
    there is or has been a panel of outside toxicologists that evaluate, as a
    check on our own internal toxicologists, the additives that are used in the
    products.
        Q. Oh, all right. So you got outside experts and had a blue ribbon
    committee to look at additives; is that right?
        A. To evaluate or oversee what we're doing relative to additives in
    addition to our own scientists.
        *22 Q. Do you know how many Surgeon General reports there have been
    since 1964?
        A. '64 and '88, I guess a couple more. I'm not sure how many.
        Q. Do you know if there's been in excess of a dozen?
        A. I have no idea.
        Q. No idea.
        Regardless of how many there are, the industry never convened a blue
    ribbon panel after any of those Surgeon General's reports to determine what
    that blue ribbon panel would say on whether smoking caused disease; did it?
        A. No.
        Q. Right up to today it's never done that; has it, sir?
        A. That's right.
        THE COURT: Counsel, I think we'll take a short recess.
        THE CLERK: Court stands in recess.
            (Recess taken.)
        THE CLERK: All rise. Court is again in session.
            (Jury enters the courtroom.)
        THE CLERK: Please be seated.
        THE COURT: Counsel.
        MR. CIRESI: Thank you, Your Honor.
    BY MR. CIRESI:
        Q. Mr. Schindler, this blue ribbon committee that looked at additives,
    you said it was in the '80s?
        A. Yes. I think they started somewhere in the mid-'80s.
        Q. They don't look at the additives in the paper; do they?
        A. I'm not sure.
        Q. They don't look at the additives in the filter; do they?
        A. I'm not sure. They may. I'm just not sure if they do or not. I know
    about tobacco -- I'm not --
        I'm just not sure whether or not they look at paper or filters. They
    may.
        Q. They don't test under pyrolysis conditions; do they?
        A. I don't believe so.
        Q. They have no idea what happens to those additives and what type of
    hydrocarbons are formed when they're subjected to the temperatures that
    tobacco is when it's smoked; correct?
        A. I really don't know what the scientific regimen is that is used by
    these folks. I know they're toxicologists, professionals in the field.
        Q. But they do not test the additives under the conditions that they're
    subjected to in smoking a cigarette; do they, sir?
        A. I do not know the answer to that question.
        Q. Now in 1959 you are aware, are you not, that RJR was aware of many
    carcinogens in its smoke that had a distinct possibility would have a
    carcinogenic effect on the human respiratory system.
        A. I believe the company was aware there were a lot of compounds -- lot
    of people were -- that were potentially carcinogenic, that were in the
    cigarettes.
        Q. That would have -- that would have a distinct possibility that they
    would have a carcinogenic effect on the human respiratory system; correct?
        A. I don't know about your specific use of the word "distinct
    possibility." I am aware or have been made aware that the company was aware
    that there were compounds in cigarettes that were being identified that
    were potentially cancer-causing, were carcinogens.
        Q. Well if they did have a distinct possibility of having a
    carcinogenic effect on the respiratory system of a human being, that would
    be a health hazard; wouldn't it?
        A. I'm not sure how to evaluate the term "distinct possibility." That
    says they may or they may not. I don't know what "distinct possibility"
    means.
        *23 Q. Can you direct your attention to Exhibit 12418. This is a
    memorandum --
        A. Is that -- excuse me. Is that 12 --
        Q. 418. I'm sorry.
        A. All right.
        Q. Do you have it, sir?
        A. Yes, sir.
        Q. If you look to the back -- last page, you'll see that's a memorandum
    from Dr. Alan Rodgman --
        A. Yes.
        Q. -- to Mr. Kenneth H. Hoover. Do you see that?
        A. Yes.
        Q. Dated November 2nd, 1959.
        A. Yes.
        Q. "THE OPTIMUM COMPOSITION OF TOBACCO AND ITS SMOKE;" correct?
        A. Yes.
        Q. And in this -- strike that.
        Did you know if Dr. Hoover or Mr. Hoover was a research director at
    RJR?
        A. I --
        No, I didn't know Dr. Hoover. I know Alan Rodgman.
        Q. And he was in the research and development department; correct?
        A. Yes, Dr. Rodgman was in research.
        Q. And we've seen some of Dr. Rodgman's memos yesterday relating to
    nicotine; correct?
        A. Yeah, sure did.
        Q. Now in 1959 Dr. Rodgman reported to Mr. Hoover concerning the
    presence of carcinogenic compounds in RJR's tobacco smoke; correct?
        A. I --
        Yeah, I guess that's what's in here.
        Q. And you see in the first paragraph that there's a reference to the
    fact that in 1954 the first report of the presence of benzopyrene in
    tobacco smoke was published?
        A. Yes.
        Q. And that was a carcinogenic or cancer-producing polycyclic
    hydrocarbon; correct?
        A. That's what this says.
        Q. Do you know what a polycyclic hydrocarbon is?
        A. Nope. I mean I've heard the term, but I'm -- as I pointed out
    yesterday, I'm not a scientist.
        Q. Do you know if they're highly carcinogenic?
        A. I -- you know, I --
        No. I mean I -- well I've -- I guess it depends on dosage level and
    exposure.
        Q. Have you heard that they're highly carcinogenic?
        A. I think I heard that they could be.
        Q. Okay. And if someone was subjected to them over 20, 30 years on a
    daily basis, is that what you're talking about as dose and exposure?
        A. I'm not a toxicologist.
        Q. Well you --
        A. I -- I --
        You're asking me if -- what happens if somebody is exposed to a
    polycyclic hydrocarbon over 20, 30 years in the form that it comes out of
    cigarettes, what happens to them. I don't know.
        Q. That's not what I asked you.
        A. Okay.
        Q. You used the term "dose and exposure." I simply asked a very simple
    question. Did you mean by that, "dose and exposure," someone who is exposed
    to them over 20 or 30, 40 years on a daily basis?
        A. No.
        Q. You didn't.
        A. I didn't mean that.
        Q. Okay. What did you mean by the term "dose and exposure?"
        A. Well the toxicologists use that term, that the risk in something has
    to do with the amount you get or the dose.
        Q. Okay.
        A. Risk is in the dose. That's sort of a fundamental principle, I
    guess, that toxicology starts with. At least I've been told that by
    toxicologists.
        Q. So if someone is subjected to a dose daily during the day of a
    carcinogen, that's a dose element; correct?
        A. Yes.
        *24 Q. And if somebody is exposed to that over 10 or 15 or 20 years,
    that's an exposure to it; correct?
        A. Yes.
        Q. And those are two terms you've heard from toxicologists; correct?
        A. Yes.
        Q. And the more they're exposed to doses, the more likely they may
    contract cancer; correct?
        A. Could be.
        Q. Now directing your attention to Exhibit 12418, do you see where Dr.
    Rodgman then reports that since 1954, approximately 60 similar compounds --
        A. No, I --
        Where are we?
        Q. First paragraph. I'm sorry, sir.
        A. Just a minute.
        Q. Do you have it?
        A. "In 1954 the first report" -- is that where --
        Where are we? You're at the very first paragraph under "HISTORICAL?"
        Q. I am indeed.
        A. Okay.
        Q. Right where we were. Do you see it?
        A. Like I said, you are more familiar with these things than I am. It
    takes me a little time to catch up.
        Q. Do you think I should be more familiar with the history of your
    company with regard to the hazards and health than --
        A. You are more --
        Q. Excuse me, sir.
        -- than the CEO of the company?
        A. You are more familiar with these documents than I am. I'm just
    trying to stay with you here.
        Q. How many years have you been with this company?
        A. Twenty-four years in May.
        Q. So you think that I should be more familiar with your own company's
    documents which bear upon safety and health than someone who's been with
    this company and who is the CEO and has been there for 24 years?
        A. Mr. Ciresi, I am talking --
        MR. WEBER: Let me -- let me object. First, it's getting argumentative,
    and he also asked it once, Your Honor.
        THE COURT: Okay. It is argumentative.
        MR. CIRESI: I'll withdraw the question.
    BY MR. CIRESI:
        Q. Direct your attention, sir, to the first paragraph. See the last
    sentence?
        A. "Since then...?"
        Q. Correct. Do you see it?
        A. Yeah.
        Q. "since then, approximately 60 similar compounds have been isolated
    from the smoke of cigarettes." Correct?
        A. Right. That's what it says.
        Q. Similar to benzopyrene; correct?
        A. Similar -- similar to benzopyrene. "Since then, approximately 60" --
        Yeah, okay.
        Q. Is that a fair statement?
        A. Yeah.
        Q. Okay. In the next paragraph it states that eight of those polycyclic
    hydrocarbons were isolated from the smoke, are known to produce cancer in
    mice. Correct?
        A. Yes, that's what it says.
        Q. "Another five or six are suspect as cancer-producing agents in
    laboratory animals." Correct?
        A. That's what it says.
        Q. And you go down to the next paragraph. "There is no evidence that
    any of these compounds will produce cancer in man. Nonetheless, there is a
    distinct possibility that these substances would have a carcinogenic effect
    on the human respiratory system. Medical experience has shown that man
    responds to various chemical substances in the same manner as experimental
    animals. It is there -- It follows therefore that it would be better for
    the consumer if cigarette smoke were devoid of such compounds." Do you see
    that?
        *25 A. Yes.
        Q. Do you agree with that statement?
        A. I think what Dr. -- yeah, I would --
        Dr. Rodgman is saying that if you have compounds in cigarettes that
    have potential for risk to a smoker, and if you could get them out, it
    would be a good idea.
        Q. Do --
        A. And I would agree with that.
        Q. And in Exhibit 18905, which was the Hill & Knowlton document, it was
    stated that the industry would remove such compounds; correct?
        A. Yeah, I seem to remember there were references in that PR document.
        Q. And RJR never removed such compounds; did they?
        A. I believe back there they tried various times and were unsuccessful,
    and that's how the whole effort on reducing risk in cigarettes with public
    health people and the industry finally turned to general reduction of
    compounds, because no one was successful at selective elimination. So basic
    principle that anybody could land on back in the '60s was general reduction
    of tar and other compounds across the board as opposed to trying to target
    or selectively remove something, because --that was tried, my
    understanding, in --
        The company back in the '50s and early '60s tried that and they were
    unable to be successful.
        Q. Is your answer no?
        A. Yes.
        Q. Thank you.
        Did you ever tell the public --
        MR. WEBER: Your Honor, I'm going to object to the sarcasm and snide
    comments and the smiling when the witness is answering. I think it's
    inappropriate.
        THE COURT: "Thank you" is not what I would consider a snide comment.
        Q. Once again, sir, if you don't understand a question that I ask you,
    please tell me.
        The last question was: Did RJR ever remove such compounds. "Yes" or
    "no."
        A. No.
        Q. Did you ever tell the public that you found those comments --
    compounds and were not removing them?
        A. No.
        Q. If we go, then, to the next paragraph. "As described in RDR, 1956,
    No. 9" --
        Do you know what that is?
        A. An RDR?
        Q. Yes.
        A. No.
        Q. Isn't that nomenclature for research and development memoranda of
    the RJR Tobacco Company?
        A. I just told you, I don't know what RDR -- RDR refers to.
        Q. Okay. "As described in RDR, 1956, No. 9, we in the R. J. Reynolds
    Tobacco Company Research Department corroborated the published findings
    with respect to 3,4-benzpyrene, obtained this compound in crystalline form,
    and positively identified it as a constituent of cigarette smoke on the
    basis of its chemical and physical properties. Some thirty-odd polycyclic
    hydrocarbons have since been similarly characterized in these laboratories.
    Of these, eight are carcinogenic in mouse epidermis. Cholanthrane, a potent
    carcinogen, is one of three not yet reported by other investigators." Do
    you see that?
        A. Yes.
        Q. That means it wasn't known to anybody else; correct?
        A. You know, that's what it says in this memo.
        Q. Did RJR ever publish that information at that time?
        A. I don't know.
        Q. If you go on to page three of this memo. Again, sir, this is back in
    1959; correct?
        *26 A. Yes, sir.
        Q. This is the "DISCUSSION" section under Roman numeral III?
        A. Yes.
        Q. And I'd like to direct your attention about halfway through that
    where it says, "Cigarette smoke should contain...." Do you see that
    sentence?
        A. Yes, I've got it.
        Q. "Cigarette smoke should contain as little as possible (preferably at
    the zero level*) of the polycyclic hydrocarbons, should possess
    satisfactory flavor to please the consumer, and should contain sufficient
    nicotine to supply the necessary requirements of the smoker with respect to
    this compound." Do you see that?
        A. Yes, I do.
        Q. And that's the physiological effects that's being referred to there
    of nicotine; correct?
        A. I don't know what Dr. Rodgman is referring to in this 1959 memo.
        Q. Then you wouldn't know if he's referring to the pharmacological --
        A. I don't know what he's referring to here.
        Q. Do you see the asterisk after "zero level?"
        A. Yes.
        Q. And if you go down to the bottom, you see that it states, "We
    consider the zero level to be impossible to achieve as long as the
    combustion temperature of the cigarette is greater than 700 degrees
    Centigrade?"
        A. Yes.
        Q. And that's the level at which tobacco burns in a cigarette; isn't
    it, sir?
        A. I'll take your word for it. I don't personally know the temperature
    that tobacco -- a cigarette burns at.
        Q. You've never asked that of your scientists?
        A. No.
        Q. Have you asked your scientists what happens under pyrolysis to the
    additives and compounds in the cigarette when they're heated at that level?
        A. No, I haven't.
        Q. Have you asked whether or not additional polycyclic hydrocarbons are
    formed?
        A. No, I haven't.
        Q. Did RJR in 1959 say to the public that it's impossible to achieve
    zero carcinogens in its cigarettes?
        A. No, not that I know of.
        Q. It never has done that; has it, sir?
        A. Not that I know of.
        Q. And if you go back up to the second full paragraph under Roman
    numeral III, and specifically the last sentence, do you see there where Dr.
    Rodgman is suggesting a threshold level of nicotine delivery?
        A. No. You're talking about "...should yield nicotine in the smoke in
    an amount ranging from 1.5 to 2.0?"
        Q. Yes.
        A. I --
        He's talking about a range of nicotine. I don't understand where that's
    any threshold.
        Q. Do you have any idea why RJR would want a range of nicotine?
        A. I have no idea what Dr. Rodgman was referring to in this memo.
        Q. Do you know, if it gets above a certain range, it may have a toxic
    effect?
        A. I imagine you could get above a certain range of a lot of things and
    get a toxic effect, so I would think that nicotine or something would have
    -- could be toxic in that sense.
        Q. If it got below a certain range, would it not have a pharmacological
    effect?
        A. Would it not? I don't know. I -- this is --
        I don't see where this is about threshold or pharmacological effect or
    toxicity or anything.
        *27 Q. If it got below a certain range, would it have no
    pharmacological effect?
        A. I have no idea.
        Q. So since you have no idea, you don't know if the cigarettes were
    designed to have a threshold level of nicotine; do you?
        A. I've never heard anybody talk about threshold levels --
        Q. And you --
        A. -- other than these couple documents. But in my experience in the
    company, running a plant, running manufacturing, interacting with R&D
    people, I never heard anybody talking about we've got to get to some
    threshold level. In 24 years I haven't heard that.
        Q. Can you direct your attention, sir, to Exhibit 18187.
        A. Yes.
        MR. CIRESI: Your Honor, would it be appropriate to take a short break?
        THE COURT: Would you like to?
        Why don't we take a short break. And don't go too far.
        THE CLERK: Court stands in recess.
            (Recess taken.)
        THE CLERK: All rise. Court is again in session.
            (Jury enters the courtroom.)
        THE CLERK: Please be seated.
        THE COURT: Counsel.
        MR. CIRESI: Thank you, Your Honor.
    BY MR. CIRESI:
        Q. Mr. Schindler, can you direct your attention to Exhibit 18187.
        A. Yes, sir, I'm there.
        Q. That would be in volume two. Do you have it?
        A. Yes, I'm there.
        Q. Now do you see that this is a document entitled "THE SMOKING AND
    HEALTH PROBLEM -- A CRITICAL AND OBJECTIVE APPRAISAL?"
        A. Yes.
        Q. And it's by Dr. Rodgman in 1962?
        A. Yes, it is.
        Q. Have you read this document before?
        A. I've seen the document. I have not read the whole document, no.
        Q. Now if you direct your attention to the bottom of the first page,
    the second-to-the-last paragraph.
        A. "Although" -- it starts with "Although," is that where you are?
        Q. Yeah. Are you there?
        A. Yes.
        Q. "Although the major part of the sales of this Company consists of
    cigarettes, what the Company sells is cigarette smoke." Do you see that,
    sir?
        A. Yes.
        Q. Do you agree with that?
        A. It's sort of --
        I don't know if I agree or disagree. We sell cigarettes and people
    smoke cigarettes. It's kind of a -- I --
        I view that we sell cigarettes. I've never viewed the business that we,
    in my mind, sell cigarette smoke. I've always viewed we sell cigarettes
    that people smoke.
        Q. And what's in the smoke is nicotine and tar; correct?
        A. There's tar and there's nicotine and a bunch of other things.
        Q. And the "bunch of other things" are polycyclical hydrocarbons and
    other types of hydrocarbons that are grouped under the name tar; correct?
        A. Yes.
        Q. And in the next paragraph it says, "During the past two decades,
    cigarette smoke has been the target of a host of studies relating to
    ill-health and particularly to lung cancer." Do you see that?
        A. Yes.
        Q. "The majority of these studies incriminate cigarette smoke from a
    health viewpoint." Correct?
        A. Yes, that's what it says.
        Q. And did Philip Morris advise the smoking public of that in 1962?
        A. I'm R. J Reynolds.
        *28 Q. Excuse me. R. J. Reynolds.
        A. No, not of this.
        Q. Do you know if Philip Morris did?
        A. I wasn't working for Reynolds in '62. I don't know about Philip
    Morris. I have no idea that Philip Morris did anything.
        Q. Do you know if The Tobacco Institute did, --
        A. I have --
        Q. -- which was supported by all of the cigarette manufacturers?
        A. I have no knowledge that the industry in 1962 wrote a report that
    says science reports that cigarettes may cause cancer.
        Q. You know of no such --
        A. I don't know of any ad like that.
        Q. In 1962 did Philip Morris -- or excuse me -- did RJR state that the
    amount of evidence accumulated to indict cigarette smoking as a health
    hazard is overwhelming and the evidence challenging such an indictment is
    scant?
        A. No, I don't believe that R. J. Reynolds said that.
        Q. Did R. J. Reynolds say that in 1988?
        A. Not that I recall.
        Q. Did it say it in 1998?
        A. No, not that I know of. No.
        Q. Can you direct your attention to page seven of this memo, "The
    Evidence to Date."
        "Obviously the amount of evidence accumulated to indict cigarette smoke
    as a health hazard is overwhelming. The evidence challenging such an
    indictment is scant." Do you see that?
        A. Yes, I do.
        Q. Have you ever seen that before?
        A. Yes, I think I've seen that before.
        Q. When did you first see it, sir?
        A. Oh, I -- I can't give you a precise date. It was somewhere, as I've
    said before, in the last year and a half. This process of getting involved
    in litigation has unfolded, and through that whole process I've seen
    various documents along the way.
        Q. Did you tell Mr. Goldstone before he testified in Congress about a
    month ago that back in 1962 RJR knew that the amount of evidence
    accumulated to indict cigarette smoke as a health hazard was overwhelming?
        A. I don't recall --
        No, I didn't tell Steve about this document in 1962.
        Q. Do you know if anybody told Mr. Goldstone that?
        A. I have no idea.
        Q. Can you direct your attention, please, to page 13 of the memo.
        A. Yes.
        Q. And if you move down to where there's a paragraph sign, "Members of
    this Research Department...." Do you see that?
        A. Yes, I do.
        Q. Okay. "Members of this Research Department have studied in detail
    cigarette smoke composition," and then there's some references. Do you see
    that?
        A. Yes.
        Q. And those references are to the back of the document; correct, sir,
    where there's a bibliography?
        A. Yes.
        Q. "Some of these findings have been published.... However, much data
    remains unpublished because they are concerned with carcinogenic and
    cocarcinogenic compounds." Correct?
        A. That's what it says.
        Q. And it then cites to certain documents in the bibliography; correct?
        A. Yes.
        Q. So that RJR in its research department had studied in detail smoke
    composition and found carcinogenic or cocarcinogenic compounds and they
    didn't publish it because of that; correct?
        *29 A. I have no knowledge that they didn't publish it. It says here
    some -- some things had remained unpublished. I don't know if a week later
    they published. I have no idea. I --
        I know the Surgeon General, I believe in '64, I've heard had paid
    compliments to Reynolds for helping in terms of discovering the compounds,
    or some of them in cigarettes, when they published the '64 Surgeon
    General's report. So I don't know if they changed their point of view on
    this afterwards or not.
        Q. Did RJR --
        A. But the Surgeon General seemed to appreciate it.
        Q. Did RJR in 1964 turn over all of the documents that have been
    disclosed in this case to the Surgeon General, sir?
        A. No.
        Q. And what Dr. Rodgman is reporting is that these findings weren't
    made public because they were concerned about carcinogenic and
    cocarcinogenic compounds; correct? That's what he reports.
        A. That's what he says.
        Q. And this was, what, eight years after the Frank Statement; correct?
        A. Yes.
        Q. Where your company represented that it believed the products we make
    are not injurious to health; correct?
        A. That's right.
        Q. And where they represented to the public that they accepted an
    interest in people's health as a basic responsibility, paramount to every
    other consideration in our business.
        A. That's right.
        Q. And where they stated we have -- always have and always will
    cooperate closely with those whose task it is to safeguard the public
    health; correct, sir?
        A. That's what it says.
        Q. They didn't meet any of those; did they?
        A. I think they were cooperating with the public health people, or the
    Surgeon General wouldn't have complimented the company for helping discover
    some of these compounds that they used in the Surgeon General's report.
        Q. Didn't turn over all the documents; did they, sir? You just said so.
        A. No, they didn't turn over all the documents.
        Q. So they decided what they would and wouldn't turn over regarding
    what they knew about their product; is that right?
        A. I don't know what was going on here.
        Q. Well let's see what Dr. Rodgman says, if we go to the next paragraph
    -- or the next sentence. "This raises an interesting question about the
    former compounds." And there he's talking about the carcinogenic or
    cocarcinogenic; correct?
        A. I guess so.
        Q. "If a tobacco company pled 'Not guilty' or 'Not proven' to the
    charge that cigarette smoke (or one of its constituents) is an etiological
    factor in the causation of lung cancer or some other disease, can the
    company justifiably assume the position that publication of data pertaining
    to cigarette smoke composition or physiologic properties should be withheld
    because such data might affect adversely the company's economic status when
    the company has already implied in its plea that such etiologic effect
    exists -- that no such etiologic effect exists?" Do you see that?
        A. Uh-huh. Yes.
        Q. And at this point in time RJR had pled not guilty and not proven;
    hadn't they?
        *30 A. I don't know. I don't know what case --
        Are you talking about court cases, or --
        Q. I'm talking about whether smoking causes --
        A. Oh, I'm sorry.
        Q. -- lung cancer.
        A. I thought -- I thought you were talking about litigation. Yes, I
    think --
        Yeah, the company's position was the causal linkage wasn't proven, or
    whatever, back in this timeframe, I guess. I wasn't here in '62.
        Q. Still does today; doesn't it?
        A. Still what?
        Q. Says that it's not proven.
        A. Well today the company's position, my position, is that if you
    smoke, if people smoke, they have an increased risk of certain diseases.
        Q. Does smoking cause lung cancer?
        A. It may.
        Q. Does it cause lung cancer?
        A. I don't know for sure, but I believe it may. I believe the risk is
    significant, and I believe we have managed this company in a way to design
    products or improve products to reduce the risk associated with smoking,
    and I'm proud of it.
        Q. Sir, does smoking cause lung cancer?
        A. I don't know.
        Q. Thank you.
        Has RJR said smoking causes lung cancer?
        A. No.
        Q. So that they are still saying, some 35 years or 36 years after this
    memo, "not proven;" aren't they?
        A. Well they're saying that the risk is there, and yes, it is not
    proven in the discrete scientific sense backed up by lab studies, backed up
    by the causal mechanism in -- to go from the risk to the cause in
    cigarettes, that's right.
        Q. Is the answer to my question yes?
        A. Yeah.
        Q. Thank you.
        And for 36 years, until this lawsuit, information was withheld;
    correct?
        A. No, that's not correct.
        Q. Did the documents in this case -- were they provided to any public
    health authority before they started coming out in this case, sir?
        A. I don't know.
        MR. WEBER: Let me object -- let me object to that, first, Your Honor.
    The question implies some obligation that hasn't been proven.
        THE COURT: It certainly does. You may answer.
        MR. CIRESI: Can you answer the question?
        THE WITNESS: Can you repeat the question?
        MR. CIRESI: May I have the question back, please.
            (Record read by the court reporter.)
        A. I don't know.
        Q. Did you ask?
        A. No.
        Q. If they had come out back in 1962 or any point up to the time they
    came out, do you think they may have affected adversely the company's
    economic status?
        A. I have no idea.
        Q. Well they've certainly affected the company's economic status as of
    today; haven't they, sir?
        A. I don't know if they have or not.
        Q. And the reason you don't know if they have or not is because your
    company, among others, is seeking immunity in Congress for past actions;
    correct?
        MR. WEBER: Same objection as earlier on that point, Your Honor.
        THE COURT: Well you may answer that.
        A. I believe what we're seeking in Congress is for society to come to
    grips with cigarettes and how to establish them in our society in a way
    that is acceptable in terms of regulatory scheme, in terms of how the
    market, and all aspects of its existence in our society. That's what we're
    after. And --
        *31 Q. You --
        A. -- part of that is that there be some limits on liability relative
    to all this litigation.
        Q. You're seeking immunity for past conduct; aren't you?
        MR. WEBER: Asked and answered, Your Honor.
        THE COURT: It's not been answered.
        A. I -- you know, I don't believe it's immunity in that sense.
    "Immunity" to me implies that there's -- you know, there aren't going to be
    any lawsuits, there aren't going to be any suits in the future. And there
    will be suits based on the way this proposal is today.
        Q. Oh, you mean total and absolute and complete immunity is the only
    type of immunity you recognize; is that right?
        A. Was that a question?
        Q. Yes.
        A. I'm giving you my answer to the way I understand the agreement.
        Q. You're seeking immunity in Congress. "Yes" or "no," sir.
        A. I believe --
        MR. WEBER: Asked and --
        Objection, asked and answered on the last one, Your Honor.
        THE COURT: It hasn't been answered.
        A. I believe --
        You're asking me my opinion. I believe what is being asked for are
    limitations relative to litigation.
        Q. Okay. And a limitation --
        A. Given the payments that will be made in the context of this
    regulatory scheme and the total package to establish the rules in our
    society as to how cigarettes will continue to exist.
        Q. A limitation on liability is an immunity to the extent it's granted.
        A. Well you're the lawyer. I'll take your word for it.
        Q. So the answer is yes, sir?
        A. Yes.
        Q. Thank you.
        A. I'm not a lawyer.
        Q. And you say for the monies you're going to be paying. You're not
    going to be paying. The smokers are going to be paying; aren't they?
        A. Any lawsuit we lose that would require us to raise our prices,
    smokers would be paying.
        Q. Yes.
        A. The only --
        Q. And --
        A. -- place we get money is from selling our product. That's the only
    place a business gets any money is from selling their product. So if you
    lose a lawsuit and it causes your prices to go up, smokers will pay more
    because that's the only place we get money from, is selling product.
        Q. Well you could sell your food group and take that money; couldn't
    you?
        A. That's, I believe -- again not a lawyer -- but that's bankruptcy.
    And --
        Q. Bankruptcy. Just to sell part of the business is bankruptcy?
        A. I think you have shareholders, and if you sell off a part of the
    business or distribute it -- the money to some -- to someone other than the
    shareholders, I think that surely gets into the realm of bankruptcy, as I
    understand it.
        Q. Well RJR has been bought and sold a number of times; hasn't it?
        A. Yes.
        Q. And parts of the business have been bought and sold; correct?
        A. And they have been transactions with shareholders.
        Q. And how many times have you gone into bankruptcy when you bought and
    sold businesses?
        A. You're talking about transaction with the shareholders right now.
    I'm talking -- you --
        But your first question is why don't you just sell off your other
    assets and give that money to people that win lawsuits.
        *32 Q. Sir --
        A. I think that's different.
        Q. Oh. An asset can be sold by the company; can it not?
        A. You have the shareholders to deal with.
        Q. Right. But an asset --
        A. They own the company.
        Q. And an asset --
        A. I think they would care if you sold off their asset and didn't give
    them any money.
        Q. Sir, an asset can be sold by the company to satisfy its debt. "Yes"
    or  "no."
        A. Yes.
        Q. If a judgment is entered against the company, it is a debt against
    the company. "Yes" or "no."
        A. Yes.
        Q. The food group was purchased with tobacco money. "Yes" or "no."
        A. It was purchased with the consolidated cash flow of the corporation,
    which included, at that time, tobacco, Sea/Land Services, containerized
    shipping, Del Monte, a bunch of different subsidiaries.
        Q. And they all started with tobacco; correct?
        A. I believe you're right.
        Q. And if the assets of the food group were sold to some other company,
    the manufacturing facilities go with it; don't they?
        A. Yes.
        Q. The employees go with it; don't they?
        A. Yes.
        Q. And that business is operated by the new entity; correct?
        A. I would assume so.
        Q. And those people keep working for that new entity; correct?
        A. Yeah.
        Q. And what RJR would get would be money for that; correct?
        A. I believe so.
        Q. And then that money could be used to pay its debt; correct?
        A. Still have some remaining shareholders to contend with.
        Q. They will indeed, sir. Shareholders who benefited --
        MR. WEBER: Let me object to the commentary, Your Honor. We're getting
    very argumentative here.
        THE COURT: Well the "will indeed" is commentary, counsel. That will be
    stricken.
        MR. CIRESI: I withdraw it, Your Honor. I apologize.
        Q. The shareholders have benefited from this company selling product,
    being cigarettes, to the public; correct?
        A. Yes.
        Q. And they have benefited based upon the management's decisions over
    the last 40 years; correct, sir?
        A. Yes.
        Q. Those decisions which bore upon the safety and health of the
    American public; correct, sir?
        A. Yes.
        Q. And they had to discharge the duties that you talked about and what
    we see in the Frank Statement in accordance with the law; didn't they, sir?
        A. I --
        You have to repeat that last one.
        Q. Management was required to discharge its duties in accordance with
    the law; correct?
        A. I believe, based on what I know and have experienced, the management
    of this company has abided by the law in discharging its duties.
        Q. And under --
        And under our system of justice, as you understand it, if someone
    doesn't comply with their duties under the law, they are held accountable;
    correct?
        MR. WEBER: I'm going to object again, Your Honor, this is
    argumentative.
        THE COURT: Well you may answer that.
        Q. Isn't that correct, sir?
        A. If it is in a courtroom, between the lawyers and the judge, the jury
    would decide who's accountable, in violation of their duties. That's the
    legal system.
        *33 Q. Yes. And if the company has not discharged its duties under the
    law, then, as you understand it, they are to be held accountable under the
    law; correct?
        MR. WEBER: Same objection, Your Honor. In addition, I'd add asked and
    answered.
        THE COURT: It's been asked and answered.
        Q. Now from 1954 to 1998 your company has continued to create doub